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Climate, Energy, Justice:
The Policy Path to a Just Transition for an
Energy-Hungry America

Executive Summary
The United States has 4 percent of the world’s population yet produces and
consumes more than 20 percent of its energy. Correspondingly, the United
States emits more than 20 percent of global greenhouse gases, largely from
its fossil fuel economy. The ravages of climate change are intensifying as we
experience increasingly potent and more frequent storms and as western
states continue to burn. Significantly, the economic, environmental, and
health burdens of the nation's current energy system and the consequences
of climate change fall disproportionately on low-income communities and
communities of color.
The United States should and could be a key player in the global transition
from a dirty energy economy to a clean energy future. Unfortunately,
although states, local governments, and some private actors are playing
important roles, federal leadership, both domestically and internationally, is
sorely lacking. With the coming election and the prospect of a more
sympathetic administration and Congress, the time is ripe for principled and
pragmatic solutions to the climate crisis. With careful crafting, such solutions
can grow the U.S. economy and benefit marginalized communities.
This paper, written by 19 energy and environmental law professors, all
Member Scholars of the Center for Progressive Reform, describes the need
for a transition to clean energy, and offers holistic policy approaches
designed not simply to reduce greenhouse gases in a vacuum, but to realize
a vision for an inclusive and more just clean economy.
Drawing on the unique expertise of its authors, the paper presents a series
of policy recommendations, all of which are based on three core ideas. The
first is that good policy requires coordination among three essential
variables – energy, the environment, and the economy. There is no
fundamental reason why the United States cannot enjoy a clean energy
portfolio, a healthy environment, and a robust and fair economy. The second
core idea, a corollary of the first, is that the transition must be just. A good
transition leaves no one behind – not workers and communities whose
livelihoods depended on the fossil fuel sector, not low-income communities,
and not communities that have disproportionately experienced negative
energy impacts. The third is that, notwithstanding significant public and
private climate initiatives around the country, the nation desperately needs
federal vision, policies, and resources. Policies predicated on these principles
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offer the best hope for our individual and collective future, both here in the
United States and around the world.

Recommendations
Applying their expertise in energy law, environmental law, environmental
justice, administrative law, and Native American law, CPR's co-authors
explore the many steps that Congress and the next president should take
toward a just, economically sound, and environmentally protective national
climate policy, offering dozens of specific recommendations for achieving a
just transition to clean energy.
The co-authors first offer a series of recommendations addressing specific
sectors critical to a clean transition, including electricity, transportation, and
public lands. They then provide cross-cutting recommendations relevant
throughout the federal government, including climate justice, governance
mechanisms, and, taking a wider view, structural insights that should inform
the relationships among federal agencies, the states, and the courts.
Sector-Specific Recommendations
• Electricity Policy: Congress should establish a federal clean energy
standard, improve the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
oversight of federal energy markets, and expand federal authority over
electric transmission line siting and the exercise of eminent domain to
enable better access to renewable resources.
• Transportation Policy: Congress and a new administration should
accelerate electrification of the vehicle fleet by revoking the Trump
administration’s efforts to lower greenhouse gas standards and by
setting higher efficiency and electric car requirements. Congress should
also require new measures to ensure adequate charging and clean
electricity infrastructure, and should facilitate measures to reduce
driving, all while prioritizing clean transportation investments in frontline
and low-income communities.
• Public Lands Policy: To protect public lands from increased risks posed
by climate change, Congress and a new administration should ensure
that federal agencies avoid or, if necessary, mitigate harms to our public
lands, that they exercise their control to phase out development of
nonrenewable energy resources, and that they marshal federal resources
to enhance climate resiliency, preserve the biodiversity of public lands,
and revise national forest planning rules to ensure forest sustainability.
Cross-cutting Recommendations
• Climate Justice: Congress should enact just transitions legislation that
provides fossil-fuel reliant communities with new and improved
economic opportunities. Congress and the administration should also
provide access to energy efficiency and renewable resources--as well as
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•

•

support for higher energy costs--to low-income communities; prioritize
climate policies that provide the most pollution-reduction co-benefits;
and provide federal parameters and support to the low-income and
frontline communities least able to cope with impending climate harms.
Governance Mechanisms: Congress and a new administration should
employ a variety of tools to achieve effective governance, including:
federally funded research and development needed to lay the
groundwork for private investment; a more realistic assessment of the
cost of inaction (known as the “social cost of carbon”) to better inform a
wide variety of regulatory actions; careful consideration of carbon pricing
options; a vision and associated strategies for achieving a just transition
in addition to carbon pricing; and well-funded and effective enforcement
of all federal climate policies.
Structural Considerations: Going beyond specific policies, Congress
should enhance effective governance by optimizing the relationships
among different agencies and levels of government. CPR Member
Scholars offer a range of insights on the factors that should guide the
allocation of authority between the federal government and the states
and among agencies with related missions, recommending a careful
balance between federal and state authority and a continued role for the
courts.

Energy, the environment, and the economy are all parts of an interrelated
whole – they are not separate and distinct areas of concern. Most
importantly, the transition to a better and cleaner future must be done justly
and democratically. We can no longer afford to indulge the erroneous
assumption that our economy must accommodate capital-intensive, largescale, fossil fuel energy production, distribution, and consumption without
accounting for the attendant social costs. Instead, we can enjoy clean
energy; we can enjoy decentralized power; we can enjoy clean air, water,
and land; and we can grow our economy and protect our citizens, even the
most vulnerable. These are not utopian aspirations; these are the demands
of social justice, and they can be met by a democratically responsive federal
government.
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Climate, Energy, Justice:
The Policy Path to a Just Transition for an
Energy-Hungry America
Introduction
Three principles undergird the analysis and recommendations offered in this
paper:

Principle 1: Integrating Energy, the Environment, and the Economy
Energy, the environment, and the economy are intrinsic parts of a whole.
Virtually all energy comes from natural resources such as coal, oil, natural
gas, or such renewable resources as wind, hydroelectric, and solar. In order
to generate usable energy, these natural resources must be discovered,
extracted or harnessed, processed, distributed, and in the case of nonrenewable sources, consumed. Environmental consequences follow each
stage of that process. These resources are marshalled by companies and the
people they employ, who live in communities that are affected by the
employment opportunities and the environmental harms they create. As
some resources wax and others wane, people’s fortunes wax and wane with
them.
There are always trade-offs between energy, the environment, and the
economy. Policies narrowly focused on only one factor – on energy but not
its environmental or economic effects; or on the environment, without
regard to our need for energy and the economic implications of
environmental protection; or on the economy, without regard to our need
for clean energy and a clean environment – could cause unnecessary harm.
Fossil fuels create energy and current jobs but are destroying our
environment. Wind power reduces climate harms and creates new
employment opportunities but could cause bird deaths. Energy efficiency
reduces the need for energy without harming the environment. With a
thoughtful weighing of the tradeoffs across policy silos, we can achieve a
just transition that maximizes benefits and reduces potential harms.

Principle 2: The Clean Energy Transition and Social Justice
Merging energy, the environment, and the economy is not only a matter of
economic policy. It is also a matter of social justice.
Throughout the 20th century, the country’s energy and environmental
policies were uncoordinated, producing an energy sector that was largescale and capital-intensive, centralized and national in scope, and
dominated by pollution-heavy fossil fuels and nuclear power. Critics like
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Amory Lovins warned that this paradigm was highly inefficient and
threatened nuclear proliferation.
Environmental justice activists – led by Professor Robert Bullard – alerted the
country to the social injustice of it all, highlighting the ways that
communities of color and low-income communities have borne the
disproportionate burden of our fossil fuel economy. They are more likely to
live close to power plants, to the refineries that generate oil and gas, to the
petrochemical facilities that produce oil-based chemicals used throughout
our economy, and to the ports, highways, and railways that generate toxic
vehicular pollution.
Our energy and environmental policies, in other words, have had
demonstrable racial and economic consequences. A clean energy transition
can not only reduce the risks of climate change – which themselves fall
disproportionately on the most vulnerable – but should also prioritize the
pollution burdens that have persistently affected frontline communities.
Policymakers leading the transition should ensure that new energy
development avoids perpetuating this trend.
A socially just transition would not only alleviate the disproportionate
pollution burdens highlighted by the environmental justice movement; it
would also promote economic justice. As an example, rooftop solar is a
critical part of the energy transition, but it must be done right. Policies
should prioritize installation on buildings in low-income areas – the
locations where residents will benefit the most from lower electricity bills.
Another key aspect of the international just transition movement is
facilitating a smooth transition for the fossil fuel workers who lose their jobs
in the fossil fuel sector. The free market is unlikely to ensure that the
individuals, communities, regions, states, and Native Americans who have
relied on fossil fuel extraction and processing will seamlessly transition to
the new opportunities created by a clean economy. Inclusive planning and
transition resources will be necessary to ensure that these workers and their
communities have a place in a better future.
Social justice and democracy are linked. The energy democracy movement
favors the decentralization of energy production and distribution. In
contrast to large central power stations where decisions are made at the top,
a decentralized energy service, such as a microgrid, can be locally owned.
Local control creates opportunities for more democratic participation and
more input from consumers than is possible under our centralized fossilfuel-based electricity model.
In short, a more decentralized and democratic energy system, one that is
more responsive to the needs of the communities it serves, can find
common ground with the environmental justice movement’s advocacy for
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environmental and economic justice. Lovins’ advocacy for decentralized
energy and Bullard’s advocacy for social justice laid the foundation for the
emerging climate justice, just transition, and energy democracy movements.
All of these initiatives are intended to protect the vulnerable from
environmental and economic harms while providing access to affordable
and democratically controlled energy.

Principle 3: Federal Leadership Is Necessary for an Effective
Transition
Many cities, states, utilities, and private companies are valiantly pursuing
climate action notwithstanding the lack of federal leadership and
insufficient resources. The majority of U.S. states have established renewable
portfolio standards. Many have also set ambitious greenhouse gas reduction
targets, and even, in some cases, integrated social justice strategies. Cities
have likewise set significant clean energy and carbon reduction goals and
adopted efficiency standards. Indeed, several cities already obtain or
generate 100 percent of the electricity consumed within their jurisdiction
from green power. Many utilities around the United States have shuttered
coal-fired power plants and replaced them with cleaner sources. And some
large consumers of electricity – companies like Walmart and Amazon – have
adopted clean energy goals and taken meaningful action toward
implementing those goals.
Important as these efforts are, they are not comprehensive, and they are not
holistic. Many states and cities are taking action – but many are not. Some
states are instituting ambitious electric car policies, but these efforts require
a national clean electricity grid and adequate charging infrastructure for the
climate benefits to fully materialize. New employment opportunities are
emerging, but not necessarily in the places where opportunities are
disappearing.
Federal leadership – leadership that respects and builds on existing
initiatives – is necessary to achieve a coherent and just transition. Recent
initiatives have started to shape a path forward. The Green New Deal (GND)
championed by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the House and by Sen.
Edward Markey in the Senate encapsulates all the above principles. The GND
integrates environmental goals with social and economic reforms designed
to simultaneously stem climate change and address the country’s depressed
economy, sustain a strong citizenry, and provide meaningful protections for
workers and other disadvantaged populations.
Similarly, in June 2020, the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis put
forth an extensive list of policy proposals that integrate energy,
environmental, and economic concerns, and that repeatedly emphasize the
importance of addressing the needs of the most vulnerable.
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Accomplishing the ambitious challenge of a clean energy transition that
leaves no one behind requires insightful, creative, carefully crafted policies.
In the pages that follow, CPR's co-authors offer recommendations
addressing specific sectors critical to a clean transition, including electricity,
transportation, and public lands, then go on to offer cross-cutting
recommendations relevant throughout the federal government, addressing
climate justice, governance mechanisms, and the relationships among
federal agencies, the states, and the courts.
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Federal Electricity Policy and the Climate Crisis
By Alexandra B. Klass, Uma Outka, Hannah J. Wiseman

Summary
The evolving nature of the U.S. energy market, coupled with the imperative
to reduce carbon emissions as a check on climate change, has left the
federal government with out-of-date and inadequate energy policies. Rather
than encouraging the transition to renewable energy sources, current
policies lean toward the status quo, propping up a system of electricity
generation that is poisoning the planet and wasting money.
In reforming federal policies to modernize the energy sector, it is vital that
lawmakers are responsive to issues of fairness and
equity. For example, household energy burdens
and the environmental harms of electric
power generation disproportionately
impact low-income people and
communities of color. Energy law reform
should seek to alleviate these burdens and
channel benefits from the clean energy
transition to areas that have been
disadvantaged. We set forth the following
recommendations discussed in more detail below:
Recommendation #1: Congress should demonstrate a national
commitment to climate change mitigation and protecting communities
from power plant pollution by enacting a federal clean energy standard.
Recommendation #2: To remove the substantial obstacles to statesupported clean energy transition posed by new regional wholesale
electricity market rules, particularly in the PJM Regional Transmission
Organization, Congress should direct the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to categorically exempt new renewable resources and
existing nuclear power plants from these rules.
Recommendation #3: Congress should expand federal authority over the
approval of new interstate electric transmission lines to support greater
integration of renewable energy into the U.S. electric grid. Congress could
combine this expansion of federal authority over transmission lines with
greater scrutiny of FERC’s practices with regard to the siting and eminent
domain for interstate natural gas pipelines and other fossil fuel
infrastructure within FERC’s existing jurisdiction.

Climate, Energy, Justice

8

Background
As a result of technological developments, government research and
financial support, and federal and state clean energy policies, the U.S.
electricity sector has changed significantly over the past decade. The use of
coal to generate electricity nationwide has dropped precipitously as electric
utilities move to cleaner and less expensive energy supplies such as natural
gas, wind, and solar energy. Moreover, many of the new energy resources
are not traditional, “utility-scale” power plants. Instead, “distributed”
localized energy resources, such as residential and commercial rooftop solar,
have exploded across the country in both rural and urban areas alongside
new large-scale wind and solar plants built by electric utilities and their
corporate partners. Greater energy efficiency resources, “demand
response,” 1 and large-scale battery technologies have also altered the
traditional electric grid, creating both new opportunities and new
challenges for federal electricity markets, grid operators, and state and
federal energy regulators.
Despite these rapid changes, significant economic, technical, and policy
barriers remain, impeding the progress toward a clean energy transition that
benefits all communities. Entrenched fossil fuel interests
and outdated laws that favor the fossil fuel status quo
Entrenched fossil fuel interests
make it difficult to bring about real change. For all the
and outdated laws that favor
talk of the clean energy transition underway, the fact
the fossil fuel status quo make it
remains that as of 2020, 62 percent of the electricity
difficult to bring about real
sector and 95 percent of the transportation sector
change. For all the talk of the
remain powered by fossil fuels. 2 Innovative federal
clean energy transition
clean energy policies are critical to decarbonizing the
underway, the fact remains that
energy sector and avoiding catastrophic climate
as of 2020, 62 percent of the
change.
electricity sector and 95 percent
of the transportation sector
This paper highlights three actions Congress can take
remain powered by fossil fuels.
to put in place policies that can support a clean
energy transition in the electricity sector: (1) a federal
clean energy standard; (2) legislation explicitly supporting
state clean energy policies in the administration of regional electricity
markets; and (3) greater federal authority to pave the way for new, interstate
electric transmission lines needed to support the integration of large-scale
renewable energy resources into the electric grid. Each of these issues is
addressed in more detail below and summarized here. In proposing these
federal policies, we urge lawmakers to be responsive to issues of fairness
and equity. For example, household energy burdens and the environmental
harms of electric power generation disproportionately impact low-income
people and communities of color. Energy law reform should seek to alleviate
these burdens and channel benefits from the clean energy transition to
areas that have been disadvantaged.
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Without a federal clean energy standard, states have taken the first step:
enacting such aggressive clean energy policies as renewable portfolio
standards, transforming, in many states, the way electric utilities do business
by mandating that an increasing percentage of the electricity they sell to
customers comes from carbon-free energy sources by a set date. Hawaii was
the first state to set a 100 percent clean energy goal in 2015, and other states
have since followed suit. 3 But these policies differ widely by state and have
not been enacted in some parts of the country at all, particularly in the
southeastern United States. This raises the question of whether a
congressionally enacted federal clean energy standard would support a
more rapid clean energy transition and benefit those states that have not
already developed an ample supply of carbon-free energy within their
borders.
As for regional electricity markets, electric utilities and other power
providers in large swaths of the United States participate in federally
regulated, interstate electricity markets within Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs). FERC provides oversight of these markets and their
rules. As a greater number of clean energy resources, such as wind, solar,
and storage, increase their participation in these markets, questions arise
over how to address state financial support for them within the RTO market
structure. As controversy has grown over FERC orders applying to one of
these markets—PJM in the northeastern United States—there is an
opportunity for Congress to act. As set forth below, Congress should give
additional policy guidance to FERC through legislation to ensure that
outdated market rules do not stymie a clean energy transition or impose
additional costs on utilities, consumers, and communities that wish to take
advantage of these low-cost, clean energy resources.
With regard to the physical electric grid, interstate electric transmission lines
are critical to integrating utility-scale wind and solar energy into the grid and
to transporting onshore wind and solar energy from where it can be
generated to population centers that are often several states away. State
laws currently make it difficult for transmission line operators to obtain
siting permits for interstate and intrastate electric transmission lines. In
addition, state laws sometimes prevent those entities from exercising
eminent domain authority for such lines. Sometimes, this is because the
actor seeking to build the line is a “merchant” transmission line company
rather than a public utility, and sometimes, this is because the transmission
of electric energy across a state (as opposed to from or to a state) is not
considered a “public need” or a “public use” under state law. In other parts of
the energy sector, interstate natural gas pipelines, for example, Congress has
acted to overcome roadblocks and created federal authority over portions of
this infrastructure. Congress can do the same with regard to transmission
lines in ways set forth below.
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Proposed Policy: A Federal Clean Energy Standard
By Uma Outka

Background and Context
The current patchwork of state renewable energy portfolio standards and
related state clean energy laws has played a critical role in advancing clean
energy resources over the last 10 to 15 years, particularly wind and solar
energy. In 2020, the use of renewable energy finally exceeded coal use on
the electric grid at a nationwide level. 4 Yet there can be no mistaking that
this is the critical decade for accelerating the clean energy transition.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the world
needs to stabilize climate change by 2030 or face dire global consequences.
In the forward to its 2019 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5° C, the
panel is clear: “Without increased and urgent mitigation ambition in the
coming years, leading to a sharp decline in greenhouse gas emissions by
2030, global warming will surpass 1.5°C in the following decades, leading to
irreversible loss of the most fragile ecosystems, and crisis after crisis for the
most vulnerable people and societies.” 5
The United States remains a top global emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
and far exceeds the per capita electricity consumption of most other
developed nations. 6 Although the trajectory for
renewables in the United States is promising, more
The United States remains a top
rapid change is needed than inconsistent state
global emitter of greenhouse
policies alone will yield. The current regulatory
gases (GHGs) and far exceeds the
landscape is a patchwork of vastly different
per capita electricity consumption
commitments to clean energy across the states,
of most other developed nations.
ranging from 50 to 100 percent clean energy goals in a
growing number of states often adjacent to states with
no formal clean energy goal at all. In short, the clean energy transition
suffers from the absence of federal guidance. The transition is underway, but
too slowly. Federal stewardship is needed to accelerate the shift the world
needs the United States to achieve, in good faith alongside every other
nation under international commitments to ambitiously reduce GHGs. 7
Now, at the start of a new and critical decade, the time is right for Congress
advance a federal clean energy standard that will rapidly shift the U.S.
energy sector away from fossil fuels.
A federal clean energy standard is not a new policy concept. There have
been dozens of proposals in Congress for just such a measure, but none to
date have garnered sufficient support to become federal law. 8 More now
than ever before, an electricity sector based on clean energy resources is
within reach. Five years ago, for example, the Deep Decarbonization
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Pathways Project outlined methods for bringing GHG emissions to 80
percent below 1990 levels by 2050 through policy reforms that would
electrify many end uses of energy while shifting away from fossil fuel
generation of electric power. 9 This year, informed by the most recent IPCC
warnings, a University of California Berkeley report outlines a pathway to “90
percent zero carbon electricity” by 2035, using among other things, a federal
clean energy standard on an accelerated timetable. 10
Importantly, a well-designed federal clean energy standard can be adopted
without compromising the progress states have made or even hinder their
momentum. Indeed, a federal standard should complement the most
ambitious states’ work by setting a nationwide trajectory that brings the rest
of the states forward. Although not every state has the same renewable
resource potential as the next, regional electricity markets covering roughly
60 percent of the country have helped to compensate for these
differences. 11 A federal standard will need complementary policies to help it
accelerate clean energy development within a narrow time horizon—for
example, support for communities that have depended on fossil fuel
industries, and the market oversight and transmission and siting reforms
discussed below. Yet it is a centerpiece policy approach that can build on
and support the most effective state models, enhanced by complementary
reforms.
It is important to recognize that a federal clean energy standard would do
more than accelerate GHG emissions reductions needed for climate
stabilization. Scaling up clean energy resources will alleviate longstanding
local and regional air pollution and water pollution caused by coal-fired and
natural gas power plants. This pollution has disproportionately harmed lowincome people, especially in communities of color. As the power generated
by these facilities is supplanted with clean energy resources, the quality of
life and public health outcomes will improve for affected communities
across the United States. This is why organizations like the NAACP
Environmental and Climate Justice Program have focused on shutting down
coal plants and other toxic facilities at the local level while working to
advance renewable energy and energy efficiency policies at the state level. 12

Recommendations
Congress should demonstrate a national commitment to climate change
mitigation and protecting communities from power plant pollution by
enacting a federal clean energy standard.
Although there are a range of instrument designs that could be explored, we
recommend the following guiding principles:
•

The standard should require the rapid expansion of renewable energy,
energy efficiency, and energy storage resources across the electric grid
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•

•

for deep reductions in GHG emissions from the electricity sector. The
standard should provide a timeline for transition that corresponds to
current climate science.
The standard should mandate or otherwise create strong incentives for
states to prioritize low income communities and communities of color
for energy efficiency and clean energy investment, through robust
community engagement.
The standard should not limit ambitious states that are innovating or
cutting GHG emissions from the electricity sector at a faster pace than
the standard requires.

Proposed Policy: Congressional Guidance to FERC in
Overseeing Federal Energy Markets
By Hannah J. Wiseman 13

Background and Context
Renewable energy infrastructure must be connected to transmission lines—
often a large network of lines—in order to be economically feasible.
Renewable generation is often located in very rural regions, and renewable
generators need to be able to send their product long distances to populous
areas called “load centers.” One historical challenge faced by renewable
generators has been the difficulty of transacting with multiple transmission
line operators to get their product – electricity – to consumers. Even when
physical transmission lines were available, renewable generators had to
contract with each transmission line operator for a rate for use of the line,
often meaning that a generator sending electricity from a wind farm to
distant customers had to pay numerous “pancaked” rates. The formation of
regional transmission organizations (RTOs) has been critical to easing the
sale of renewable generation because RTOs take over operational control of
the wires from individual utilities, thus avoiding pancaked rates. RTOs also
create competitive, wholesale markets for electricity that give renewable
generators outlets for their electricity beyond the traditional, long-term
“power purchase agreement” in which a customer commits to a purchase of
electricity at a set rate or fixed, gradually increasing rate, often for a period of
twenty years.
RTOs, although essential to enabling the recent expansion of renewable
generation, have also stymied the addition of renewable capacity in some
cases. This is most apparent in the Mid-Atlantic area, where FERC has
ordered the RTO in this region, PJM, to require that most generators bidding
into the competitive PJM market offer a minimum price. This “minimum
offer price rule,” or MOPR, applies to capacity markets, which are markets in
which generators commit to supply electricity in the future. In other words,
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generators commit to build new infrastructure or otherwise have
infrastructure available to supply electricity. Capacity markets are key to
spurring the construction of new generation infrastructure, because without
an assurance that their generation will be used and purchased, generators
are often hesitant to build.
FERC’s MOPR order issued to PJM in 2019 requires the RTO to set a minimum
“floor” price in its capacity market. 14 Any generator that receives state
subsidies, and that is therefore able to bid into the market at a price below
this floor, has to receive case-by-case approval from PJM to bid in at this
lower rate. The only exempted renewable resources are those that are
already operating to meet states’ existing renewable portfolio standards or
had cleared a capacity auction or completed an agreement to interconnect
with PJM wires prior to the date of the order. 15 The many new renewable
resources that must be built to comply with states’ more
aggressive clean energy measures are subject to the
Fossil fuel generators receive
rule. Additionally, existing resources that receive state
hidden subsidies because, due to
subsidies, such as zero-carbon nuclear power plants, are
the lack of a federal carbon tax or
subject to the rule and may not be able to continue
other federal regulation of carbon
operating if subject to the MOPR. 16 Aside from the
emissions, they externalize their
resource-specific exemptions, the only other way for
environmental damage, leaving
renewable and nuclear generation to avoid the rule is to
everyone else on the planet to pay
apply for a “Unit-Specific Exemption,” justifying a price
the cost in the form of illness and
below the floor by showing specific data about the
death and various forms of
generation unit’s costs. 17
environmental degradation.
FERC’s MOPR order has the result of making it less likely
that state-subsidized renewable and nuclear resources will
“clear” the capacity auction—in other words, decreasing the chance that
these generation products will be selected and paid for in the capacity
auction. A similar MOPR in another RTO, ISO New England, was also
approved by FERC.18
FERC’s justification for the MOPR is that allowing state-subsidized generators
to bid into competitive markets at lower rates undercuts competition and
creates unjust and unreasonable rates. But as others have noted, fossil fuel
generators receive hidden subsidies because, due to the lack of a federal
carbon tax or other federal regulation of carbon emissions, they externalize
their environmental damage, leaving everyone else on the planet to pay the
cost in the form of illness and death and various forms of environmental
degradation. 19 Further, the MOPR interferes substantially with states’ ability
under the Federal Power Act to set generation policy, and it could increase
prices by entrenching old energy infrastructure that is not subject to the
MOPR. One FERC Commissioner’s strong dissent from the FERC MOPR order
for PJM sums up the issues nicely: “From the beginning, this [FERC]
proceeding has been about two things: Dramatically increasing the price of
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capacity in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) and slowing the region’s
transition to a clean energy future.” 20
Estimates of the impacts of the PJM MOPR vary substantially, but many are
bleak. First, states and individual utilities that wish to continue subsidizing
renewables and avoid the MOPR problem have the option of leaving the
RTO’s capacity market and instead adopting a strategy called a “Fixed
Resource Requirement.” 21 The independent market monitor for PJM
estimates that this could increase costs--in just one capacity auction--by
several million dollars. 22 For states that opt to have utilities within the state
remain within the PJM capacity market, analysts project that some
renewable resources, such as offshore wind, would not clear the markets at
all, meaning that offshore wind would still be built but would not be
recognized as a resource to supply electricity needs in the future. Some
analysts believe that the capacity markets--blind to the offshore wind
resource as a result of its failure to clear capacity auctions--would instead fill
the additional electricity need with other resources, such as fossil fuel-fired
power. This would produce more electricity generation than is needed, and
the generation would be dirtier. 23
Numerous parties have petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to
review the FERC MOPR order, and PJM has completed two compliance
filings with FERC in an effort to follow FERC’s MOPR order but avoid some of
the major, costly consequences of the order. 24 The March 2020 compliance
filing, which is most relevant to zero-carbon resources, lowers the floor
prices at which solar and wind resources could bid into the capacity market,
among other provisions. 25

Recommendation
To remove the substantial obstacles that ISO-NE and PJM MOPRs place on
nuclear power and new renewable energy resources, Congress should direct
FERC to categorically exempt new renewable resources and existing nuclear
power plants from all MOPRs. The ability of these resources to request caseby-case exemptions from the MOPR is too onerous and will slow the rapid
additions of low-carbon resources that many state policies require. Congress
should also consider banning MOPRs altogether to make for “cleaner” law
without an excess of complex exemptions. Indeed, some states are
contemplating withdrawing from the RTO capacity markets, or even the RTO
entirely, simply to avoid MOPR policies. This will make the transport of
electricity into these states more cumbersome and, ultimately, more
expensive for electricity users. This problem could be avoided simply by
removing the MOPR impediment that is spurring a potential exodus from
otherwise-important RTOs.
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Proposed Policy: Expanded Federal Authority over Electric
Transmission Line Siting and Eminent Domain
By Alexandra B. Klass

Background and Context
Electricity transmission lines constitute critical infrastructure needed to
integrate more renewable energy into the electric grid, particularly by
transporting large-scale wind energy where it exists in the Midwest and
Plains states to population centers several states away. Transmission lines
are often controversial and sometimes meet with opposition by affected
landowners and private property rights advocates. Outdated state laws
provide a legal hook that enables opponents to block interstate
transmission lines. This has led to fatal roadblocks for several interstate
transmission projects, most notably those proposed by the merchant
transmission line company Clean Line Energy Partners. Particularly for the
interstate electric transmission lines required to transport wind energy from
the middle, less populated parts of the country to population centers, the instate need is often less compelling than the larger regional or national need
for such lines. As a result, opponents argue that regional need or national
need for renewable energy cannot justify the use of land for a project if the
line will not bring significant amounts of electricity to state residents or
lower the price of electricity in the state.
In addition, some states allow only “public utilities” to apply for permits. That
has prevented some private merchant transmission line companies
developing interstate transmission lines from obtaining required permits.
Beyond barriers posed by landowner opposition and antiquated state policy,
state eminent domain authority is predicated on demonstrating that the
land is being taken for a “public use.” Where the transmission lines are
intended to cross a state, relaying energy from out-of-state generators to
out-of-state residents, rather than providing transmission from an in-state
source or to in-state residents, landowners have questioned whether there is
a “public use” justifying the exercise of state eminent domain authority.
State courts have in some cases invalidated the use of eminent domain
authority on such grounds.
Individual landowner and community opposition to large electric
transmission lines is understandable. Most transmission lines are not buried,
and they thus can be aesthetically unpleasing and create environmental
harm, such as habitat fragmentation, if not carefully planned. Furthermore,
as with the siting of other large infrastructure, they can be placed in areas
where developers face—or perceive to face—the least opposition, including
areas with relatively low land values. This can result in environmental justice
concerns, since the cheaper land developers favor is often home to low-
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income and minority communities. Any policy that federalizes the siting of
transmission lines must carefully account for the impacts of these lines and
ensure that environmental justice issues are centrally considered within the
siting process. Existing federal laws, if applied correctly, should help to
ensure this careful consideration—particularly the National Environmental
Policy Act. Additionally, there should be further federal emphasis on and
support for distributed renewable resources, such as rooftop solar, that
avoid the need for new, large transmission infrastructure in the first place.
In several instances in the past, Congress has acted to expand federal siting
or eminent domain authority precisely to overcome state barriers similar to
the ones described above. For example:
Natural gas pipelines: Congress created federal siting and nationwide
eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines under the
Natural Gas Act of 1938 (with amendments in 1947) to
override state regulatory barriers to such projects.
Any policy that federalizes the
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
siting of transmission lines must
now has authority to grant a Certificate of Public
carefully account for the impacts of
Convenience and Necessity for such projects, as well
these lines and ensure that
as to grant nationwide eminent domain authority if
environmental justice issues are
the project meets economic and environmental
centrally considered within the
requirements.
siting process. Existing federal laws,
Liquefied natural gas: Congress created federal
if applied correctly, should help to
siting authority (but not eminent domain authority)
ensure this careful consideration—
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) import and export
particularly the National
terminals in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, in
Environmental Policy Act.
response to concerns that state regulators were
blocking these projects and that national energy needs
would be compromised as a result.
Cell phone towers: In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress
responded to concerns over local opposition to new cell phone towers by
allowing local governments to retain siting authority but creating new,
federal standards for how local governments should process the
applications, preempting local government prohibitions on cell phone
towers, creating strict timelines for local approval, and authorizing
expedited review of local decisions in federal court.

Recommendations
•

Congress should expand federal authority over the approval of new
interstate electric transmission lines to support greater integration of
renewable energy into the U.S. electric grid. Congress could combine this
expansion of federal authority over transmission lines with greater
scrutiny of FERC’s practices with regard to the siting and eminent
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•

•

•

•

domain for interstate natural gas pipelines and other fossil fuel
infrastructure within FERC’s existing jurisdiction.
Congress could accomplish this by granting FERC siting authority over
interstate electric transmission lines, as well as authorizing FERC to
approve eminent domain authority for such lines. This would be
consistent with existing federal law under the Natural Gas Act that
governs siting approval and eminent domain authority for natural gas
pipelines.
In the alternative, Congress could leave siting and eminent domain
authority with the states but create additional procedural requirements
and expedited review of permit denials in federal court as was done in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for cell phone towers.
Congress could amend existing provisions in the Energy Policy Act of
2005 to clarify that FERC has authority to override state denials of siting
permits in certain circumstances and thus reverse federal court decisions
to the contrary. 26
As part of an expansion of federal authority over transmission lines,
Congress could reform the Natural Gas Act to require FERC to consider
GHG emissions as part of that agency’s review process for granting siting
certificates and eminent domain authority for natural gas pipelines and
liquefied natural gas (LNG) import and export terminals. FERC’s process
for approving these controversial fossil fuel projects has been subject to
significant criticism for the climate change impacts of such projects as
well as the interference with landowner property rights. Thus, Congress
could combine expanded federal authority over clean energy projects
like transmission lines with greater scrutiny of fossil fuel projects like
pipelines and LNG terminals.
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Transportation Policy and the Climate Crisis
By Alexandra B. Klass, Hannah J. Wiseman, and Alice Kaswan

Summary
Cars, trucks, and other modes of transportation are the leading cause of
climate change in the United States. Two major policy changes in the
transportation sector will therefore be necessary to substantially reduce U.S.
carbon emissions. First, direct carbon emissions from cars, trucks, and other
vehicles must be reduced through further fuel efficiency requirements and
the electrification of the vehicle fleet. Second, policy tools must incentivize
or mandate practices that reduce the number of vehicle miles driven each
year, through better land use planning, for example. This white paper
focuses on the first set of tools—those that directly reduce
carbon emissions from individual vehicles—but
also briefly touches upon methods for reducing
the use of cars and trucks. We also propose
that investments in alternative vehicles
prioritize reductions in frontline
communities, so as to maximize copollutant reduction benefits and address
longstanding racial and economic inequities in
pollution exposures.
As required by the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) had jointly
implemented ambitious standards to reduce carbon emissions from
vehicles, primarily by requiring more efficient vehicles 27 and approving
California’s alternative standards, which included zero-emission vehicle
requirements. But recent final rules issued by the Trump Administration—
the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule 28—reversed much of
this progress. A new Congress or administration should reinstate the
previous progress. The electrification of vehicles, in turn, will require more
governmental support for the purchase of electric vehicles and the
installation of charging infrastructure. We explore these needed policy tools
and the potential roles of the federal government, states, and local
governments in implementing these tools, and we set forth the following
recommendations, each discussed in more detail below. The top priorities
for a more widespread and rapid transition to vehicle electrification and
reduction in miles driven should include the following.
Recommendation #1: Congress should direct the Department of Energy
(DOE), in concert with auto manufacturers and state and local governments,
to plan for the optimal location of additional charging infrastructure on
federal and state highways.
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Recommendation #2: Through direct budgetary measures and competitive
grant programs, Congress should fund the installation of charging
infrastructure on federal and state highways and at workplaces.
Recommendation #3: Beyond what is already proposed in the CLEAN
Future Act, Congress should direct the DOE to establish a multi-stakeholder
committee to write a model state building code for the location and
connection of EV charging stations near buildings and in parking lots, a
model state code for the rates charged for the use of EV chargers (if any),
recommended methods and rate structures for compensating customers for
sales of electricity from car batteries to utilities, and a recommendation that
states exempt EV chargers from the definition of “public utility.”
Recommendation #4: Congress should enact new legislation to expand the
subsidization of electric vehicles. This legislation should include
subsidization of the transition away from diesel fuels used in trucks and
buses. Through this legislation, Congress should also consider converting
the subsidization of electric vehicles from a tax credit to a rebate, eliminating
subsidies for natural gas vehicles, and reserving a substantial percentage of
rebates and other incentives for low-income consumers.
Recommendation #5: Congress should expand existing funding for public
mass transit and land use planning that reduces vehicle miles traveled,
particularly in and through frontline communities. As recommended by the
Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, Congress should direct the
Department of Energy to establish performance measures for Metropolitan
Planning Organizations to include metrics such as enhancing urban infill,
ensuring that new housing is located closer to existing transportation, and
similar metrics.
Recommendation #6: We highlight a theme running through all of the prior
recommendations: Congress should direct clean transportation investments
and land use planning improvements to low-income and frontline
communities.

Background
Vehicles recently surpassed power plants as the leading contributor of
carbon pollution in the United States. 29 Air pollution from the transportation
sector is directly associated with the number of vehicles on the road, miles
driven, and the efficiency (and thus emissions per mile) of vehicles. 30 The
average annual number of miles driven by Americans continues to increase,
as do the total number of registered vehicles on highways. 31 Americans
continue to purchase cars and trucks and drive more miles due to personal
preferences, land use patterns, and the lack of adequate alternative modes
of transportation, among other factors.
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Health and Environmental Co-Benefits . Beyond producing carbon
emissions, transportation also emits more damaging air pollution than any
other sector. In 2005, researchers from MIT and other universities
comprehensively studied mature deaths from air pollution and found that
cars and trucks cause 53,000 early deaths annually in the United States, as
compared to 52,000 early deaths caused by power generation. 32 A more
recent study shows 107,000 premature U.S. deaths from fine particulate air
pollution, with 28 percent of those deaths caused by transportation as
compared to 14 percent from electricity generation and 15 percent from
agriculture. 33 Diesel particulate pollution from trucks, buses, ships, and rail
presents particularly high health risks.

Economic Benefits for Consumers : Improved fuel efficiency can reduce
gasoline costs, increasing the money available to U.S. consumers for nontransportation uses. Better fuel efficiency could also reduce the impact of
potential oil price increases on the U.S. economy. Despite
these economic benefits, fuel-efficiency standards and
Beyond producing carbon
financial incentives are necessary because the market
emissions, transportation also
does not adequately incentivize consumers to demand
emits more damaging air
and auto companies to produce more fuel-efficient
pollution than any other sector.
vehicles and EVs. Consumers frequently focus on shortIn 2005, researchers from MIT
term rather than long-term costs, and may undervalue
and other universities
the long-term cost savings associated with electric cars.34
comprehensively studied
Job Creation Benefits : Despite Trump administration
mature deaths from air
claims that electrification will cause job losses,
pollution and found that cars
incentivizing the manufacture and sale of more EVs
and trucks cause 53,000 early
could increase jobs—indeed, perhaps double them by
deaths annually in the United
2030, according to some sources. 35
States, as compared to 52,000
early deaths caused by power
A critical mechanism for greening transportation is to
generation.
electrify the vehicle fleet, particularly now that a declining
percentage of electricity comes from carbon-intensive coal.
Successful electrification, in turn, requires enhanced charging infrastructure
and use of vehicle-to-grid technologies so that electric car drivers can
maximize the value of their cars. Because low-income consumers and small
businesses are unlikely to be able to afford the initial investment in clean
vehicles, federal support should prioritize transportation investments in
frontline communities.
Reducing the number of vehicles and miles traveled by those vehicles is
another important way to lower transportation sector emissions. Indeed,
reductions in carbon and other pollutant emissions through vehicle
efficiency measures can be offset if more people drive and drive more miles.
We therefore also discuss public transportation and improved land use
planning approaches in this paper.
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There are three primary ways to directly reduce carbon emissions from
individual vehicles for each mile driven, including making vehicles more
efficient, transforming the vehicle fleet from a gasoline-powered fleet to an
electric one, and reducing how much we drive. The first strategy, increasing
vehicle efficiency, has historically been a success story, and, under recent
regulations, efficiency was on course to further improve. But the steady
increase in average miles per gallon of the vehicle fleet was recently limited
by a Trump Administration regulation. The electrification of vehicles is a
more complex endeavor that requires integrating several policy approaches,
as explored below. And finally, inducing Americans to stop driving, or to
reduce miles driven through public transportation and metropolitan land
use planning, is a critical and challenging policy approach.

Proposed Policy: Increase Vehicle Efficiency through
Improved Regulation
By Hannah J. Wiseman

Background and Context
The Clean Air Act requires the regulation of harmful air pollutants from cars,
and under the terms of that landmark law, the EPA has established and
repeatedly updated vehicle emissions standards. In 2007, the Supreme
Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA, held that the law applied to
carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles, and required EPA
The Trump Administration
to regulate carbon emissions from vehicles or justify a
recently finalized a rule that
decision not to so regulate. In 2009, the Obama
would freeze emission standards
Administration proceeded to regulate vehicle carbon
at the 2020 number, with no
emissions, and, because the mechanisms for reducing
further improvements through
carbon emissions overlap considerably with the
2025. As a result, efficiency
mechanisms for increasing efficiency, ordered EPA to
standards are set to increase by
coordinate with the National Highway Transportation
just 1.5 percent annually
and Safety Agency’s issuance of fuel efficiency
between 2021 and 2026.
standards. 36 These agencies collaborated to issue joint
fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
standards. 37
Though harmonized to ease manufacturer compliance, these standards are
important independently. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards, expressed in miles per gallon, reflected NHTSA’s statutory
mandate to conserve oil, while EPA’s GHG emission standards reflected the
Clean Air Act’s statutory mandate to regulate pollutants that endanger
health and welfare.
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Recommendations
Since this initial drafting of the CAFE standards, NHTSA and the EPA further
strengthened these requirements, with continued improvements in vehicle
efficiency through 2025. 38 However, the Trump Administration recently
finalized a rule that would freeze emission standards at the 2020 number,
with no further improvements through 2025. As a result, efficiency standards
are set to increase by just 1.5 percent annually between 2021 and 2026. 39 A
separately issued part of the rule represented a significant departure from
past practice: NHTSA concluded that the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, which governs vehicle efficiency standards, preempts California’s
greenhouse gas emissions limits and its requirements for zero-emission
vehicles. 40 Although the Clean Air Act generally permits California to
establish more stringent standards and allows other states to follow
California's lead, NHTSA and EPA have precluded California from playing
that leadership role for GHG emissions.
A simple fix would be for Congress to direct the EPA and NHTSA to repeal
these rules, reinstate California’s ability to require zero-emission vehicles and
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars, and reinstate the former,
more stringent, federal efficiency improvements and vehicle emissions
standards rules.

Proposed Policy: Enhance Measures to Further Electrify the
Vehicle Fleet
By Alexandra B. Klass, Alice Kaswan, and Hannah Wiseman

Background and Context
More efficient cars emit fewer greenhouse gas emissions, but deep
reductions in emissions from vehicles will not be achieved until substantial
numbers of gasoline-powered vehicles are replaced with electric vehicles,
which emit zero carbon when powered by zero-carbon electricity. This will
require more ambitious zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates as well as
further subsidization of electric vehicle purchases and charging
infrastructure.

Recommendations
Enhance manufacturer zero-emission vehicle mandates. Manufacturer
mandates are designed to stimulate industry innovation – to force
automakers to develop emission-free technology. The Obama
Administration’s joint CAFE and GHG emissions standards were somewhat
technology-forcing because they encouraged manufacturers to achieve the
standards through some degree of vehicle electrification. 41 As
manufacturers provide more low- and zero-emission vehicles, the average
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emissions from their vehicles goes down, enabling the attainment of
stringent fleet-based efficiency and emissions standards. Explicit zeroemission vehicle mandates, like those developed by California and adopted
by a range of other states, have provided an even more direct technologyforcing incentive. 42
The Zero-Emissions Vehicles Act of 2019 (H.R. 2764/S. 1487) offers a more
ambitious approach. The proposed bill would amend the Clean Air Act to
require manufacturers of passenger vehicles to deliver for sale 50 percent
electric vehicles and other zero emissions vehicles by 2030 and 100 percent
by 2040. 43 If enacted, this Act would advance transportation emission
reductions more quickly than Obama-era vehicle standards. Indeed, the
House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis has proposed an even more
aggressive timeline, recommending that beginning in 2035, all new
passenger vehicles sold should be zero-emission vehicles and that all new
heavy-duty trucks should be zero-emission vehicles beginning in 2040. 44
Further subsidize electric vehicle purchases. The existing federal tax credit
for electric vehicles has been somewhat effective at incentivizing their
purchase. But under current federal law, the tax credit of $7,500 declines and
phases out completely after an automaker sells 200,000 EVs. As a result, tax
credits are no longer available for EV purchases from Tesla or
General Motors (which manufacturers the Chevy Bolt).45
Although tax credits can be
Further subsidization of electric vehicle purchases will
effective in spurring new vehicle
be necessary to spur a large-scale consumer switch to
sales, a federal rebate may be even
electric vehicles. Members of Congress have already
more effective. Studies have
introduced bills to do precisely that. The Driving
shown that EV incentive programs
America Forward Act (H.R. 2256/S. 1094) would provide
are most effective when the
a tax credit of up to $7,000 with a vehicle cap of 600,000
incentive is very clear to car sellers
total vehicles per automaker.46 The Electric Credit
and buyers and when the benefits
Access Ready at Sale (Electric CARS) Act of 2019 (H.R.
of the incentive accrue at or near
2042/S. 993) would repeal the vehicle cap altogether
the time of sale.
and extend the $7,500 tax credit through December 31,
2029. 47
Moreover, although tax credits can be effective in spurring new vehicle
sales, a federal rebate may be even more effective. Studies have shown that
EV incentive programs are most effective when the incentive is very clear to
car sellers and buyers and when the benefits of the incentive accrue at or
near the time of sale. 48 A rebate offered at the time of sale would likely
inspire more consumers to purchase an EV, and it might also be a clearer
instrument for automobile salespeople to understand and promote. Studies
have demonstrated that car dealership sales personnel often do not
understand EVs, do not have appropriate incentives to sell them, and steer
customers towards non-EVs even when customers express interest in
purchasing EVs. 49 Likewise, some vehicle retailers are even unaware of the

Climate, Energy, Justice

24

existing federal EV tax credits and fail to tell potential customers about these
credits.
Substantial rebates are also essential if proposed mandates for electric
vehicles go into effect. If by 2035 or a similar date all passenger vehicles sold
must be zero-emission vehicles, this mandate will disproportionately affect
lower-income new car buyers who cannot afford these more expensive
vehicles. Further, these mandates – if not accompanied by adequate rebates
–might push many new-car buyers to purchase used, gasoline-powered
vehicles instead, thus substantially negating the intended benefits of
mandating a zero-emission vehicle fleet.
In addition to passenger vehicles, further incentives are needed to spur the
electrification of buses and medium- and heavy-duty trucks. California has
been a leader in truck electrification, requiring truck manufacturers to
increase the percentage of zero-emission trucks sold, requiring 40 to 75
percent zero-emission trucks by 2035, with the specific level and target date
varying by class of truck. 50 As noted above, a federal House committee
recommends that heavy duty trucks be fully zero-emission by 2040. Federal
legislation should emulate this approach and provide funding for the
purchase of electric trucks and further advancement of electric truck
technology. The proposed draft CLEAN Future Act takes one step toward
this needed support by creating a pilot program with federal grants that
would support projects to electrify refrigerated trucks. 51
Beyond trucks, deep reductions in carbon emissions from transportation will
require more widespread electrification of buses. Several existing federal
programs take important steps toward this effort. The Federal Transit
Administration awards grants for public bus fleets, and these grants support
a variety of projects, such as upgrading bus terminals. One permitted use of
the funds is to assist the replacement of buses in fleets with battery-electric
buses, with 2020 grants supporting these efforts in places like Davis,
California, and the County of Suffolk, New York. 52 The proposed Green Bus
Act of 2019 would require all of these funds to be used to purchase zeroemission buses as of October 1, 2029. 53 The DOT’s Low-No Program, already
in place, specifically “provides funding to State and local governmental
authorities for the purchase or lease of zero-emission and low-emission
transit buses.” 54 Continued federal support for these types of projects will be
essential. Current law, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act, only authorized funding through FY 2020, which ended on September
30, 2020. 55
With respect to school buses, under the Diesel Emissions Reduction Act of
2010 (DERA), the EPA annually issues $15,000 or $20,000 rebates to public
and private school bus fleet owners who replace diesel buses with EPAcertified clean buses, including, among others, battery-powered buses. 56
The CLEAN Future Act would amend existing programs for the retrofitting of
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school buses to include grants specifically for retrofitting buses to make
them “low or zero emissions.” 57 As with other buses, continued federal
funding for replacement and retrofitting of school buses will be critical.
Expand incentives and planning for the installation of EV charging
infrastructure. Federal planning incentives for EV charging infrastructure
and charging corridors are perhaps even more important than consumer
vehicle purchase incentives. Studies have shown that large numbers of
potential customers will not purchase an EV until they have assurances that
they will be able to easily charge the EV at home, at public charging stations,
at workplaces, and on highway charging corridors during long-distance
travel.
Expand the funding of charging infrastructure. With regard to tax
incentives for installing charging infrastructure, Congress enacted a tax
credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property in 2005,
extended it several times until it expired in 2017, and then
Studies have shown that large
revived it to extend through the end of 2020. 58 The credit
numbers of potential customers
is 30 percent of the cost of qualified property, with a
will not purchase an EV until they
$30,000 limit for businesses at each location and a limit of
have assurances that they will be
$1,000 for a taxpayer’s residential property. 59 Like other
able to easily charge the EV at
temporary tax credits that may or may not be extended,
home, at public charging stations,
the efficacy of this credit is limited by uncertainty
at workplaces, and on highway
surrounding its durability. The Electric CARS Act of 2019
charging corridors during long(S. 993/H.R. 2042) would extend the credit through 2029.
distance travel.
If extended or made permanent, similar tax credits could
support new investment in higher-voltage EV charging at
homes, at workplaces, in parking lots, and at such commercial
establishments as grocery stores, shopping malls, or gas stations. 60 However,
this tax credit would not help incentivize construction on highway corridors
of the Level 3 direct current fast chargers (DCFC) more suited to longdistance travel. This is because Level 3 chargers are significantly more costly
than Level 2 chargers, and thus the tax credit will not significantly reduce the
high, up-front infrastructure costs of this infrastructure. Congress should
therefore consider a significantly larger tax credit for Level 3 chargers or
create a rebate program to fund such infrastructure.
The Clean Corridors Act of 2019 (H.R. 2616/S. 674) would create a grant
program for state, tribal, and local governments to install publicly accessible
EV charging infrastructure along alternative fuel corridors (on national
highways) designated by the federal government, states, or groups of
states. 61 Under the proposed EV Freedom Act, the DOT and DOE would help
create a network of charging infrastructure—also on national, public
highways—by writing a plan for the location of the infrastructure and
issuing grant for entities to install charging infrastructure in accordance with
the plan. 62 America’s Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019 contains
nearly identical language. This Act, if enacted, would provide $1 billion for
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these same activities but would not be limited to EV charging infrastructure;
it would also cover hydrogen and natural gas fueling stations. 63 Similarly, the
CLEAN Future Act would provide support for state and local government
and private installation of charging stations. 64
Unify building standards and charging rate structures and enhance
vehicle-to-grid capabilities. In addition to supporting the installation of
physical charging infrastructure, the federal government needs to do more
to enhance the uniformity of standards for charging infrastructure
technologies and installation and to incentivize the development of
technology and standards that will allow EV owners to sell electricity from
their batteries to electric utilities – technology called “vehicle-to-grid”
technology. Further, the federal government needs to do more to support
efforts to enhance the predictability, fairness, and reasonableness of the
rates charged for the use of charging infrastructure.
With respect to building standards, the CLEAN Future Act proposes a model
building code for electric vehicle supply equipment and vehicles.
Specifically, the draft Act directs the Secretary of Energy to propose a model
building code that would include electric vehicle charging
infrastructure and parking in plans for commercial and
A critical component of building
residential buildings. 65 The Leading Infrastructure for
sufficient EV charging
Tomorrow’s America Act, introduced in May 2019,
infrastructure is planning and
includes identical language. 66 Congress should be more
funding a nationwide network of
proactive in requiring the Secretary of Energy to
Level 3 direct current fast
spearhead a collaborative, multi-stakeholder effort to
chargers on highway corridors for
develop a model uniform building code, which would
long-distance travel.
include specifications for electric connections; more
details with respect to the types and size of spaces in
which charging infrastructure should be located;
specifications regarding the empty space that should be left on or near
commercial buildings for the charging infrastructure and its recommended
proximity to electrical outlets; and other information.
In addition to encouraging the installation of more charging infrastructure
through uniform building codes, Congress should direct the DOE to form a
multi-stakeholder committee to issue a model uniform code to states for
ratemaking procedures associated with EV charging infrastructure. This code
should address the issue of state utility commissions’ treatment of EV
charging—likely with a recommendation that EV charging stations not be
treated as public utilities. The code should also include recommendations
for how states should regulate charging rates (if at all), and how rates could
be developed to value and compensate electricity sold from car batteries to
the grid through vehicle-to-grid technologies.
Expand EV corridor planning. As noted above, a critical component of
building sufficient EV charging infrastructure is planning and funding a
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nationwide network of Level 3 DCFC chargers on highway corridors for longdistance travel. In federal legislation, these corridors are typically called
“alternative fuel corridors” or “AFCs” and federal support for these corridors
has included planning for the installation of fueling stations for hydrogen,
propane, and natural gas vehicles in addition to EV charging stations. For
several reasons, however, this section focuses primarily on the importance of
planning EV charging stations specifically. First, although hydrogen vehicles
do not emit air pollution, they have faced a steep uphill battle in terms of
manufacturing and deployment, and their relevance is currently marginal.
As EVs continue to improve, they are likely to be the most important point of
focus. Further, propane and natural gas vehicles are not zero emission
vehicles. Although they reduce conventional air pollution in urban areas,
which is exceedingly important given illnesses and premature deaths
associated with this air pollution, they increase greenhouse gas emissions as
compared to conventional gasoline-powered vehicles. 67 Indeed, scientists
have concluded that compressed natural gas-fueled vehicles “are not a
viable mitigation strategy for climate change.” 68 Planning for EV charging
infrastructure should therefore be the highest federal priority and the focus
of future legislation.
Section 1413 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act;
P.L. 114-94) enacted in 2015 sought to address that goal by requiring the
U.S. Department of Transportation to designate by 2020 national AFCs to
promote alternative vehicle use, including EVs. 69 Since that time, the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) has been working with industry, other
federal agencies, and state and local governments, to plan AFCs, develop
uniform signage, determine when highway segments are “corridor ready,”
and help fund charging infrastructure within AFCs. FHWA has detailed
information on the status of corridors and funding on its website. 70 FHWA is
also helping coordinate funding from other related programs, such as
Volkswagen’s "Electrify America" investments resulting from the company’s
vehicle emission cheating settlement with EPA and the state of California,
and the Department of Energy’s Clean Cities Coalition Network, which helps
state and local governments fund EV charging infrastructure.71
Congress should continue to monitor FHWA’s progress on AFCs and should
likely provide additional funding and directives to expand the AFC effort
well beyond 2020.
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Proposed Policy: Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled
By Alice Kaswan and Hannah J. Wiseman

Background and Context
Moving to more efficient transportation, and particularly to battery-powered
transportation, is critical to climate efforts in light of the large contribution
of transportation to carbon emissions. But battery-powered transportation
still requires electricity, and achieving zero-carbon electricity is likely to be
challenging and will take time. Reducing the number of vehicle miles driven
is therefore another essential component of the effort to address climate
change. This requires the expansion of mass transit and continued efforts to
plan new land development in a way that reduces commuting distances.

Recommendations
Encourage mass transit. To make low-carbon public transit more available
to more U.S. residents, Congress should channel more funding to mass
transit grants. This funding should build upon existing programs such as the
Urbanized Area Formula Grants Program. 72 Congress should also continue
to fund efforts to maintain and repair mass transit
infrastructure, including, for example, the State of Good
Mass transit functions more
Repair Grant Program.
effectively in higher-density
Congress should also consider directing the Department
communities because density
of Energy to initiate a prize-based program that would
helps generate sufficient
encourage contributors to propose cost-efficient,
ridership to enable frequent and
effective, and broadly accessible mass transit programs
dependable service. Conversely,
for specific cities. Although existing grants, including the
it is difficult to sustain in lowUrbanized Area Formula Grants Program, include
density suburban and rural
funding for planning and research, a competitive prize
contexts. Facilitating housing
directed specifically at mass transit planning could
near workplaces and near mass
perhaps incentivize more innovative and effective
transit hubs would reduce
planning. Some mass transit systems end up resulting in
vehicle miles traveled.
low ridership, in part due to subpar design. If routes and
pick-up and drop-off locations are not carefully planned
and researched, public transit can be overbuilt and underused.
Encourage land use planning and local infrastructure projects that
reduce the need for driving. Land use patterns significantly affect driving
patterns, with greater sprawl increasing vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and
associated emissions. In addition, mass transit functions more effectively in
higher-density communities because density helps generate sufficient
ridership to enable frequent and dependable service. Conversely, it is
difficult to sustain in low-density suburban and rural contexts. Facilitating
housing near workplaces and near mass transit hubs would reduce VMT. In
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addition, infill within underutilized urban areas could reduce continued
sprawl. (As discussed below, however, such efforts must be carefully
designed to address potential co-pollutant increases and gentrification.)
Alternatives to and disincentives for vehicles, such as bicycle lanes,
pedestrian-friendly streets, parking or access fees, could also reduce VMT.
Although land use planning and housing are traditionally subject to local or
state control, the federal government provides substantial funding for
highways and transportation, and could condition highway funding on
regional planning to reduce VMT and associated emissions. The Select
Committee recommended legislation requiring DOT to establish
performance measures for Metropolitan Planning Organizations (which plan
for and dispense highway funds) to address GHG reductions, access to
transportation systems, VMT reductions, and climate resilience, as well as
grant programs to support state and local efforts to meet the performance
measures. 73 In addition, the Committee recommended that Congress
require states to plan and implement transportation projects that facilitate
biking and walking. 74

Proposed Policy: Direct Clean Transportation Investments
to Frontline and Low-Income Communities
By Alice Kaswan

Background and Context
Transportation emissions disproportionately impact frontline communities,
which are often located close to sources of transportation emissions,
including highways, rail lines, and ports. Moreover, people in low-income
communities can ill afford new, zero-emission vehicles that would improve
local conditions. As a consequence, without proactive measures to channel
zero-emission options such as EVs and mass transit to poorer communities,
zero-emission vehicles and their air quality benefits will be more prevalent in
wealthy communities, and will remain out of reach for the poorer
communities that would most benefit from air pollution reductions.
Moreover, not all transportation emissions are equal: diesel emissions
contain toxic particulates that pose substantial cancer risks.75 Diesel
emissions hit many frontline communities hard, whether located near ports,
rail depots, warehouses, or emanating from agricultural or mining
operations. 76 Addressing diesel emissions also poses a just transitions
challenge: independent truckers, small farms, and small businesses with
local cargo vans could find it difficult to afford new zero- or low-emission
clean vans or trucks, even if the cost of operating the new vehicles is lower
over time, as policymakers predict. 77 Similarly, lower-income communities
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could find it difficult to fund new zero-emission buses – for public transit and
for schools - to replace diesel buses.
Considering a clean transition more broadly, transportation emissions,
which rely on individual or local purchases rather than controls on industrial
facilities, raise a key social justice issue: who gets to participate in the
transition to a clean economy? Carefully tailored government policies are
necessary to ensure that frontline and low-income communities are part of
the transition, and able to reap the opportunities and benefits associated
with clean energy.

Recommendations
Prioritize diesel emission reductions and support the transition from
diesel to zero-emission vehicles. Given the high risks posed by diesel
pollution in frontline communities, federal climate legislation should place a
high priority on truck and bus electrification. As noted, California’s Advanced
Clean Truck Rule, adopted in June 2020, is already pushing manufacturers to
develop and supply zero-emission trucks. To increase the supply of clean
trucks, the House Select Committee recommends that climate legislation
require a 100 percent transition to zero emission heavy-duty vehicles by
2040, 78 and recommends increased federal support for research and
development to spur new technologies for the largest long-haul trucks
posing the most significant decarbonization challenge. To increase demand
for clean trucks, the Select Committee also recommends national purchase
incentives and grants for zero-emission trucks, buses, commercial vehicles,
and other diesel equipment, as well as support for additional infrastructure,
like charging stations.
In determining the distribution of funds to support a diesel transition,
Congress should provide financial support in areas suffering from the
heaviest diesel pollution, such as at ports, in areas with multiple warehouses
– which function as magnets for diesel trucks – and in areas otherwise
suffering from serious air pollution. The Select Committee’s
recommendations repeatedly state that “EPA should prioritize grants for
projects that would benefit environmental justice communities and other
communities disproportionately exposed to diesel pollution.” 79 Similarly, the
Select Committee recommends that continued support for electrifying
school buses should prioritize “[s]chool districts in underserved communities
and communities disproportionately exposed to air pollution.” 80
Invest in clean and affordable mass transit. As noted, in communities with
existing mass transit or sufficient density to support mass transit, we need
increased investment in zero-emission mass transit. In most urban areas,
frontline and low-income residents make greater use of mass transit and
would benefit from diesel reductions inside buses and in their communities.
Mass transit funding should require or prioritize investments that directly
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serve, or would reduce pollution in, frontline communities. As noted, the
Select Committee proposes at least doubling federal funding for mass
transit and states that “[t]ransit projects that reduce air pollution and
improve mobility in environmental justice communities and underserved
rural areas should receive additional funds and consideration.” At the same
time, federal legislation should direct agencies to give less priority to
investments, like commuter rail lines, that risk triggering sprawl or would
provide few benefits to frontline communities. Affordability is also a key
issue, both to reduce regressive impacts on low-income residents and to
encourage use. Federal support is likely to be necessary to enable many
municipalities to keep transit costs low.
Provide funds and structure for shared mobility options in frontline and
low-income communities. Alternatives to individual car ownership are
increasing in areas where car ownership is not necessary on a daily basis, but
mass transit cannot meet all needs. The specific needs are likely to vary
considerably, and local communities are best situated to identify the options
that would work best for them. Frontline and low-income communities
without sufficient resources will need federal support to realize these
options. California, for example, has adopted an incentive program for car
sharing and “clean mobility options” in disadvantaged communities where
residents lack accessible or sufficient public transportation. 81
Through land use measures to reduce VMT, address the needs and
concerns of frontline and low-income communities. In some areas, like
California, the lack of affordable housing near workplaces has resulted in
poorer residents moving farther afield to find housing, substantially
increasing transportation emissions. Conversely, urban infill
development designed to bring suburban residents
Land use planning measures to
closer could lead to gentrification in urban low-income
reduce vehicle miles traveled will
areas. That gentrification would not only adversely
be an important part of the policy
impact these households but could also induce lowermix, but they cannot occur in a
income residents to move out of the city, undermining
vacuum. Planners, working with
the infill development’s VMT-reducing objectives.
affected communities, should
In addition, land use measures that reduce VMT and
integrate housing and public
overall emissions could nonetheless cause localized
health factors to generate holistic
pollution increases. Until most vehicles are zeroplans for just and sustainable
emission, denser development could increase urban
development.
pollution. And if transit-oriented developments are
located along highways, they could expose residents to
high levels of pollution typically found adjacent to major roadways.
Land use planning measures to reduce VMT will be an important part of the
policy mix, but they cannot occur in a vacuum. Planners, working with
affected communities, should integrate housing and public health factors to
generate holistic plans for just and sustainable development. The Select
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Committee specifically recommends that Congress incentivize not simply
housing near transit, but the provision of affordable housing near transit, to
provide greater access to opportunities and reduce the need to drive for
low-income residents. 82 That recommendation is a start, but more
comprehensive integration of affordable housing and access to work, health
care, and education should be integrated into sustainable land use planning.
Reserve consumer car rebates for low-income households. Because
individual car ownership may be less prevalent in the future, we have not
prioritized incentives for individual car ownership. Some role for cars is,
however, inevitable, and so such incentives should be included in federal
legislation. There is some evidence that most of the benefits of federal
passenger vehicle tax incentives have, however, gone to wealthy
households that would likely have been able to afford the vehicles without
the tax relief. 83 Tax incentives facilitating new and used electric car
purchases by low-income households would concentrate support in the
communities where such support is most necessary. 84 In addition, it would
foster electric vehicle ownership in the communities where transitioning
from fossil fuels would achieve the greatest public health benefits.
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Federal Public Lands Policy and the Climate
Crisis
By Robert L. Fischman, Christine A. Klein, Daniel J. Rohlf, and Sandra B.
Zellmer

Summary
The concept of “sustainability” is embedded in numerous laws governing
federal land management. With respect to the nation’s rangelands and
forests, Congress directs the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S.
Forest Service to manage under principles of multiple-use sustained yield. In
addition the BLM must prevent “unnecessary or undue degradation” of
lands under its jurisdiction, while the U.S. Forest Service must provide for
“diversity of plant and animal communities.” The dominant-use public land
systems have more conservation-oriented missions. The National Park
Service must manage units by such means as will leave their resources
“unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,” while the Fish &
Wildlife Service must manage wildlife refuges to maintain “the biological
integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System … for the
benefit of present and future generations.” The Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), an often
overlooked public lands management agency,
must manage the coastal zone in a manner
“consistent” with approved state coastal
management programs, which in turn
seek to “preserve, protect, develop, and
where possible, to restore or enhance, the
resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this
and succeeding generations.”
Achieving the sustainability goal has become more urgent than ever due to
rapidly changing climate and human-driven development patterns. In order
to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their needs, we propose four categories
of legislative reforms to promote ecological, social, and economic
sustainability on and through the nation’s public lands.
Recommendation #1: Enact sequential mitigation and net conservation
benefit legislation requiring all federal land managers to use sequential
mitigation to establish a net conservation benefit goal or, at a minimum, a
"no net loss" of wetlands goal.
Recommendation #2: Phase out nonrenewable energy development on
federal lands.
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Recommendation #3: Create biodiversity resilience funds to promote
restoration of biodiversity on federal and non-federal lands.
Recommendation #4: Legislate portions of the national forest planning
rules to ensure sustainability in the face of climate change.

Proposed Policy: Sequential Mitigation and Net
Conservation Benefit
By Robert L. Fischman

Background and Context
Federal public lands are subject to various forms of commodity, recreational,
and energy development. Organic legislation establishing the framework for
managing public resources typically provides a standard for determining
which activities or impacts might be permissible. Even the
National Park System may authorize projects that create
When enacted decades ago, use
adverse impacts on ecosystems as long as they do not
restrictions in federal public land
rise to the level of impairing park resources for future
law were major steps forward in
generations. Congress provides similar thresholds for the
conservation. They were written
other major public lands systems, such as national
to stop agencies from repeating
wildlife refuges (ensure “maintenance of biological
egregious mistakes, such as uses
integrity, diversity, and environmental health,” and
incompatible with wildlife
compatibility with other refuge objectives), BLM
protection in the refuges and
resources (“prevent unnecessary or undue degradation”),
clear-cutting that dumped
and national forests (providing for biodiversity and
sediment by mass wasting in the
permitting logging where it is physically suitable for
forests.
watershed conditions, restocking will occur within five
years, and aquatic resources are protected).
When enacted decades ago, the restrictions in federal public land law were
major steps forward in conservation. They were written to stop agencies
from repeating egregious mistakes, such as uses incompatible with wildlife
protection in the refuges and clear-cutting that dumped sediment by mass
wasting in the forests. While they have succeeded in limiting the worst
activities, they lack any requirement that people profiting from federal lands
pay the full cost of the harm they cause. As a result, even projects that meet
the congressionally mandated requirements individually often have adverse
ecological effects cumulatively. Federal resources suffer from death-by-athousand blows, as incremental harms add up to continual degradation. This
unfortunate shortcoming is manifest in declining biodiversity and ecological
services, such as water purification, upon which Americans rely.
Sequential mitigation, which is widely practiced in national and international
programs, is a strategy to arrest biodiversity and ecosystem services decline

Climate, Energy, Justice

35

from land degradation. 85 The strategy is sequential because it first seeks to
avoid harms, then to minimize whatever harms cannot be avoided, and
finally to mitigate whatever harms remain from ecologically impairing
activity. The strategy has played an important role in the United States by
reducing national net loss of wetlands through the Clean Water Act’s fill
permit program, and by preventing extinctions in the incidental take permit
program of the Endangered Species Act. Sequential mitigation is the gold
standard for both recovering biodiversity lost to development as well as
ensuring that the public is compensated, in-kind, for the resources it
sacrifices through permitting and other decision-making processes.
Yet, federal public land management lacks sequential mitigation
requirements. And the programs that do exist are vulnerable to shifts in
priorities of the executive branch. For instance, the Obama administration
attempted to require compensatory mitigation through a presidential
memorandum, a tool that is notoriously unenforceable. Some agencies,
including the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, began to operationalize the
mandate of the memorandum, but the Trump administration succeeded in
undoing those agency efforts.

Recommendation
Congress should codify and expand upon the Obama memorandum. It
should enact legislation requiring all federal land managers to use
sequential mitigation to establish a net benefit goal or, at a minimum, a "no
net loss" goal applicable to any impairment of the public lands, temporary or
permanent, in biodiversity and ecological functions. It would supplement
rather than replace the existing threshold requirements for determining
which projects may proceed on federal lands.
Avoiding degradation is more likely to succeed than attempts to mitigate
the impact from such degradation. When a resource's value is determined to
be irreplaceable, avoidance would be the preferred goal. Instead of
compensating to an even trade, the statute could require a "net
conservation benefit" for all federal permits and projects. In that way, the
uncertainty of successful minimization and mitigation itself is incorporated
into the compensation demanded by the public for use of federal resources.
It also creates a more accurate price signal for prospective consumers of
federal public resources. Any doubts about the extent of ecological damage
to be mitigated should be resolved in favor of providing a net conservation
benefit.
Sequential mitigation and net conservation benefit is a strategy tested and
refined over the years by existing federal programs by such agencies as the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (though in its role under the Endangered
Species Act, not as a federal land manager). Agencies and permittees already
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have the tools to fulfill a sequential mitigation requirement of net
conservation benefit. For instance, the Fish & Wildlife Service’s incidental
take permit program employs such measures as:
•
•
•
•

avoiding the impact on protected species and habitat through project
design,
minimizing the impact through best management practices,
minimizing the impact by reducing or eliminating other threats, and
mitigating (offsetting) impacts by restoration of degraded habitat,
enhancement of functional habitat, preservation of habitat, creation of
new habitat, and translocating or repatriating species.

It is time for Congress to end its decades-long neglect of federal land
management legislation and act to stop the degradation of public resources.
It should extend sequential mitigation and net conservation benefit
requirements to all federal land and resource management programs under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the National Forest
Management Act, the National Park Service Organic Act, and the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act.

Proposed Policy: Phase Out Nonrenewable Energy
Development on Federal Lands
By Christine A. Klein

Background and Context
Congress has long required that federal public lands be put to sustainable
uses, benefitting both present and future generations. Despite these
mandates, federal fossil fuel leasing – both onshore and offshore – has
encouraged the production of climate-destabilizing forms of energy. Almost
24 percent of the crude oil, natural gas, and coal produced in the United
States is derived from the federal lands, and the combustion of such
nonrenewable fuels under federal leases accounted for almost 24 percent of
carbon dioxide emissions by the United States between 2005 and 2014. To
close this gap between public lands law and practice, Congress should
expressly forbid new leases related to fossil fuel development and prohibit
renewal of existing, nonproductive leases.
This course-correction would reduce outdated market subsidies for
nonrenewable fuels that render clean energy less competitive. By some
accounts, annual subsidies for fossil fuel production on federal lands total
about $7 billion, the elimination of which would more than compensate for
the loss of royalties from federal leases. A prohibition against the issuance of
new leases on federal lands – coupled with the nonrenewal of existing,
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nonproductive leases – could lessen carbon dioxide emissions and reduce
industry infrastructure investments that lock us into a fossil fuel economy.
Restricting fossil fuel production on federal lands would also contribute to
climate justice. Communities of color and low-income communities suffer
disproportionately from the refining of fossil fuels. According to one study
by the Clean Air Task Force and the NAACP, in some states, 20 percent or
more of the African American population lives within half a mile of a fossil
fuel production, processing, or storage facility. Likewise,
such communities suffer disproportionately from the
Restricting fossil fuel production
combustion of fossil fuels by coal-fired power plants.
on federal lands would also
More broadly, vulnerable communities suffer more
contribute to climate justice.
from the impacts of climate change perpetuated by
Communities of color and lowactivities such as the use of fossil fuels.
income communities suffer
disproportionately from the
When the federal land systems were established – in
refining of fossil fuels. According
some cases more than a century ago – we lacked
to one study by the Clean Air Task
widespread awareness of how fossil fuel use
Force and the NAACP, in some
destabilizes Earth’s climate. At that time, leaving
states, 20 percent or more of the
carbon-based fuels in the ground may have been
African American population lives
unthinkable. But today, it is the continued development
within half a mile of a fossil fuel
of such dirty fuels from another era that is becoming
production, processing, or
increasingly unthinkable. As the Fourth National
storage facility.
Climate Assessment of 2017 acknowledges, “human
activities, especially emissions of greenhouse … gases,
[are] the dominant cause” of an increase in the global average temperature
of about 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit from 1901 to 2016. The federal public lands
can be part of the climate change solution, rather than the problem.

Recommendations
Prohibiting use of federal lands for fossil fuel production is not a new idea.
Models for action include former Vice President Joe Biden’s climate plan
(banning new oil and gas permitting on public lands and waters) and H.R.
2242, Keep It in the Ground Act of 2017 (proposing prohibition on BOEM’s
and the BLM’s ability to issue, renew, reinstate, or extend any nonproducing
lease, or to authorize exploration or production of fossil fuels in specified
areas). Congress should phase out nonrenewable energy development on
federal lands and waters by adopting the following measures:
New leases: Prohibit all new leases for fossil fuel exploration and
development on federal lands, both onshore and offshore. This could be
accomplished by amendment of organic acts for the national parks, national
forests, national wildlife refuges, and BLM lands, as well as amendment of
the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. Alternatively, this could be accomplished by the passage of a new
federal lands and waters act.
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Phase out existing leases: Prohibit federal agencies from renewing,
reinstating, or extending any nonproducing leases that have not yet vested
as property rights that would trigger just compensation for governmental
“takings.” Explore funding sources to buy out particularly problematic
existing leases.

Proposed Policy: Create Biodiversity Resilience Funds
By Daniel J. Rohlf

Background and Context
Biodiversity – the variety of life on Earth, the ecosystems that sustain life, and
the genetic diversity species contain – provides humans with enormously
valuable services and resources, ranging from pollinating our crops to
forming the genetic building blocks of new medicines and products.
Adverse impacts on this natural asset not only imperil these benefits, but are
the root cause of the unparalleled health and economic devastation of the
current COVID-19 pandemic and the seeds of similarly devastating events in
the future. Humans also share tangible and intangible connections with the
other species that share this planet. These connections are evident in
innumerable ways – the physical and cultural importance of other species to
indigenous cultures, the joys of teaching our children about whales, lions,
and elephants, and the thrill of seeing animals in the wild to name just a few.
Importantly, intact biodiversity also promotes resilience in the face of a
changing climate. For example, wetlands provide vital wildlife habitat, purify
and store water supplies, and serve as natural buffers against storm surges
and flooding that are increasing as climate change causes increased weather
extremes. Forests store vast amounts of carbon and protect watersheds and
wildlife, while in an urban setting an abundant tree canopy saves energy by
providing natural cooling services to dwelling and businesses, improves air
quality, and even provides direct health benefits to city-dwellers. Moreover,
the genetic code of plants and animals that thrive in extreme conditions can
help us make our food supply more resilient on an increasingly
unpredictable planet.
While important provisions of federal law limit adverse impacts to
biodiversity, particularly on federal lands, governments and landowners
often lack the resources to reverse past damage to ecosystems and wildlife,
and to take action to restore these crucial systems. For example, the federal
Endangered Species Act outlaws federal actions that “jeopardize”
endangered species or destroy their critical habitat, but actions outlined in
recovery plans to restore those same species and habitats are often stymied
due to grossly inadequate federal appropriations. Similarly, programs
providing incentives to private property owners to protect and restore
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habitat on their land – actions that would benefit society as a whole – are
often nonexistent or woefully underfunded.
Even worse, current federal law includes some financial provisions that
discourage or stand in the way of protecting biodiversity and adapting to
climate change. For example, debt that federal power marketing agencies
owe to the U.S. Treasury can discourage actions to restore biodiversity. The
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal agency that markets
hydroelectric power from federal dams in the Columbia River Basin, is in
financial trouble in part because the agency is still paying off decades-old
public debt for the cost of never-completed nuclear power plants. BPA has
therefore staunchly opposed investments that it acknowledges would take a
significant step toward restoring endangered salmon and steelhead runs,
such as breaching the four outdated federal dams on the lower Snake River.
In a similar vein, the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues to
pay to rebuild homes and buildings in flood zones many times over, despite
the certain knowledge that climate change is increasing the frequency of
flooding in precisely those areas. As a result, FEMA’s beleaguered National
Flood Insurance Program is currently $25 billion in the red.
Fortunately, perhaps more than any other aspect of environmental policy
today, protecting the natural areas required to maintain functional
biodiversity – including providing funding for these protections – often
garners bipartisan support at the federal level. In August 2020, for example,
President Trump and Republican legislators highlighted a new federal law
providing full annual funding for the Land and Water Conservation Fund,
plus creation of the National Parks and Public Land Legacy Restoration Fund
– a pot of money that will provide up to $1.9 billion annually for five years to
cover priority deferred maintenance projects in national parks, national
wildlife refuges, national forests, and on land administered by the Bureau of
Land Management. The new law, known as the Great American Outdoors
Act, was actually the culmination of many years of effort by both Democratic
and Republican lawmakers, and will allow both state and federal land
managers to better protect biodiversity and will provide facilities for visitors
to enjoy public lands and the wildlife those lands support.
Congress should sustain the momentum of this recent bipartisan effort to
protect and restore biodiversity, as well as the infrastructure to enable
people to sustainably enjoy this vital resource, by creating additional legal
mechanisms to fund similar efforts. Strategic investment in protecting and
restoring biodiversity now will pay dividends many times over during the
lifetimes of our children and grandchildren.
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Recommendations
Congress should create a new series of Biodiversity Resilience Funds to
promote restoration of biodiversity on federal and non-federal lands alike.
These funds should include the following:
Biodiversity Climate Resilience Fund: Most economists agree that putting
a price on carbon emissions, in the form of a carbon tax or cap and trade
scheme, is the most effective and economically efficient way to force
polluters to internalize the costs of carbon pollution and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Many jurisdictions – including a growing number of countries
and the state of California – already have such schemes in place. When
creating such a framework at the federal level, Congress should allocate 10
percent of the proceeds to the Biodiversity Climate Resilience Fund. The
Council on Environmental Quality, using criteria established in regulations
and on advice from a national Board of Advisors made up of representatives
from local, state, and tribal government, as well as scientists appointed by
the National Academy of Sciences, should allocate these funds for programs
and projects that protect and restore biodiversity and promote climate
resilience. Such programs and projects may include those carried out by
federal agencies, such as funding recovery plans for endangered and
threatened species, grants to state and local governments for “green
infrastructure,” and funding for new and existing programs to fight climate
change such as compensating farmers for changing cultivation methods to
better sequester carbon.
Federal Debt-for-Biodiversity Swaps: Congress should use its authority to
restructure federal financial instruments to foster biodiversity restoration.
For example, debt-for-biodiversity swaps would allow a federal agency such
as BPA to receive financial credit from the U.S. Treasury for the value of steps
the agency takes to protect biodiversity. Similarly, FEMA could retire its $25
billion debt for the National Flood Insurance Program by buying out flooded
properties rather than paying to rebuild them again and again.
Biodiversity Restoration Fund: Congress should amend federal law to
provide that the 50 percent of energy development revenues not allocated
by the Great American Outdoors Act should go into the Biodiversity
Restoration Fund. The Department of Interior should allocate proceeds from
this fund to replace funds allocated to the Land and Water Conservation
Fund lost due to our proposed ban on new offshore fossil fuel leasing that
Congress should also immediately enact (see p. 5).
Urban Tree Canopy Protection and Restoration Fund: Congress should
immediately enact a small national excise tax on timber from both public
and private lands, the proceeds of which should be allocated by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to a fund providing grants
to cities and municipalities to protect urban tree cover and urban wetlands.
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Proposed Policy: Legislate Portions of the National Forest
Planning Rules to Ensure Sustainability
By Sandra B. Zellmer

Background and Context
In June 2020, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced a blueprint
to “modernize” the U.S. Forest Service. In touting the benefits of his
blueprint, Perdue said, “I’m from Georgia where we see
trees as a crop, and it’s a longer term crop, but it’s a
The National Forest Management
productive renewable resource, and guess what, it also
Act (1976) was pathbreaking
has the ability to take carbon out of the air.” Perdue
legislation at the time. No longer
also remarked, “As stewards of the land it’s our moral
would forests be managed as
obligation to leave it better than we found it, and … we
monoculture commodity crops;
can do that through active management.”
no longer would the extraction of
minerals, oil, and gas be
Secretary Perdue appears to envision management as a
undertaken with no regard for
streamlined, siloed exercise. He concluded his speech
ecological consequences or the
by promising to reduce rules that “complicate” forest
needs of future generations; no
management. “We want to expedite environmental
longer would decisions be made
reviews to support active management to protect
behind closed doors without
communities, businesses, watershed and wildlife
meaningful public input and
habitat.”
scientific analysis.
Expediting review is precisely the wrong way to go.
In 1976, when Congress passed the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), it embraced a number of recommendations from a blue ribbon
committee of scientists that had been convened for the purpose of
reforming unsustainable practices on our National Forest System lands.
NFMA was pathbreaking legislation at the time. No longer would forests be
managed as monoculture commodity crops; no longer would the extraction
of minerals, oil, and gas be undertaken with no regard for ecological
consequences or the needs of future generations; no longer would decisions
be made behind closed doors without meaningful public input and scientific
analysis.
NFMA includes several key provisions relevant to healthy watersheds,
ecological integrity, and climate sustainability. The focus on watersheds and
forest protection goes all the way back to the Organic Act of 1897, and forest
management has been guided by a congressionally mandated sustainability
principle since 1960. But NFMA added an essential tool for accomplishing
these purposes: land and resource management plans (Forest Plans). These
Forest Plans go hand in hand with environmental review under NEPA. In fact,
NFMA tracks closely with NEPA, which requires federal agencies to “[u]tilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of
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the natural and social sciences … in planning and in decision-making which
may have an impact on man's environment,” and to “[i]nitiate and utilize
ecological information in the planning and development of resourceoriented projects.”
With NEPA analysis lighting the way, NFMA requires the development of
forest plans every 15 years or so. At present, many national forest units are
undergoing revisions, providing the public with a golden opportunity to
influence forest management for years, and even decades, to come.
Contrary to Secretary Perdue's visions, forests are not to be managed as
“tree farms”; rather, under NFMA, forest plans permit logging only where it is
physically suitable for watershed conditions, soils, and slopes. NFMA also
utilizes forest planning to ensure that aquatic resources and the diversity of
plant and animal communities are ensured.
As for climate, NFMA mandates the Forest Service account for the effects of
climate change when assessing the status of forests, rangelands, and other
renewable resources under its jurisdiction and when developing
recommendations for resource management. The Forest Service’s 2011
National Roadmap for Responding to Climate Change recognized that
maintaining diverse, functioning forest and grasslands is critical in dealing
with the variable and uncertain and impacts of climate change. “While
systems are certain to change, having a greater array of ecosystems and
species reduces our vulnerability to the impacts of a changing climate.”
According to the Roadmap:
A primary purpose for reserving Federal forest land at the turn of the 20th
century was to protect watersheds. Today, roughly one out of five Americans
depends on a national forest for drinking water. The quantity and quality of
America’s water, however, are affected by a changing climate. Rising air
temperatures mean less snow, along with faster and earlier snowmelts.
Greater variability in the volume and timing of precipitation means more
floods and droughts. Warmer water … alters critical fish habitat, while
increased evapotranspiration leads to drier vegetation and more fire, insects,
and pathogens.
The Roadmap acknowledged that forests “play an increasingly vital role in
protecting the Nation’s watersheds … [as they] reduce erosion, recharge
aquifers, regulate stream flows, moderate water temperatures, and protect
water quality.” Sustainably managed forests provide carbon sequestration
and biomass energy as well.
Although NFMA includes fairly sophisticated sustainability requirements, it
still leaves a great deal to political influence and agency discretion. 86 To
cabin that discretion, the planning regulations required by NFMA § 1604(g)
help solidify the statutory requirements with binding standards. The most
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recent planning regulations were issued by the Obama Administration in
2012 after years of proposed revisions, many rounds of public comment, and
litigation. It took more than a decade to revise the previous version of the
regulations, which took effect in 1982. Proposed revisions were launched by
the Clinton Administration in 1999, but they were retracted and reworked by
the Bush Administration in 2005. The current regulations were revised and
issued in final form in 2012.
The politicization of the planning regulations has generated a great deal of
uncertainty and skepticism. Planning has fallen badly behind schedule. As of
2012, of the nation’s 130 forest plans, more than half (68) were past due for
revision. To date, only a handful of revisions have been completed under the
2012 planning rule. 87 From catastrophic wildfires to other forms of habitat
loss, experts agree that “chronic delay hampers effective resource
management.” 88 Our National Forest System is too important to let languish.
Congress should kickstart the sputtering effort to modernize forest
planning.

Recommendations
To fulfill NFMA’s sustainability goal and to minimize the uncertainty and
political maneuvering that takes place through changes in short-term
administrative priorities, we recommend that several of the provisions of the
2012 Planning Rule be legislatively mandated. Congress should amend
NFMA’s planning provisions to require forest plans to include the following
components:
•

•

•

Include standards to maintain and restore ecosystem integrity and
diversity of ecosystems and habitat types throughout the planning area,
including components to maintain or restore structure, function,
composition, and connectivity, taking into account conditions in the
broader landscape that may influence sustainability within the plan area,
as well as system drivers, including dominant processes, disturbance
regimes, and stressors, such as natural succession, wildland fire, invasive
species, and climate change.
Provide ecological conditions necessary to keep common native species
common, contribute to recovery of threatened and endangered species,
conserve proposed and candidate species, and maintain viable
populations of species of conservation concern and of focal species.
Species of conservation concern “occur in the plan area and ... the best
available scientific information indicates substantial concern about the
species' capability to persist over the long-term in the plan area.” Viable
populations persist over the long term with sufficient distribution to be
resilient and adaptable to stressors and likely future environments.
Select and monitor focal species on the basis of their functional role in
ecosystems in order to evaluate the status and trends of overall diversity

Climate, Energy, Justice

44

•
•
•

and to assess ecological conditions. Focal species serve keystone
functions as engineers of ecological processes or in food web dynamics.
Adapt management strategies and plans through revisions or
amendments as necessary to respond to new information.
Ensure consistency of every project and decision with the plan.
Require meaningful analysis of environmental impacts and alternatives
for plan revisions, amendments, and all other major federal actions on
National Forest System lands pursuant to the 1978 CEQ regulations (for
example, ensure that adoption and revision of every forest plan is
accompanied by an EIS). Authorize categorical exclusions only for those
minor actions that are known to have insignificant environmental effects,
individually and cumulatively.

In addition, with respect to the effects of climate change, Congress should
spur the Forest Service to stay on top of best practices of modeling and
adopting adaptation strategies. NFMA should be amended to incorporate
climate-smart components of the Forest Service’s 2011 National Roadmap
for Responding to Climate Change and related regulations:
•

•

Forest plans must recognize that maintaining diverse, functioning forest
and grasslands is critical in dealing with the variable and uncertain
impacts of climate change.
Forest plans must include requirements to monitor, assess, and manage
forest resources and to apply these steps to ongoing, near term, and
longer term activities and decision points in order to implement a
comprehensive, science-based approach for managing forests and
grasslands sustainably in an era of climate change.
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Climate Justice and the Climate Crisis
By Shalanda H. Baker, Alice Kaswan, Sarah Krakoff, and Hannah J. Wiseman

Summary
Climate change has disproportionate negative impacts on Black, Indigenous,
people of color (BIPOC) and low-income populations throughout the United
States. Pre-existing structural inequalities in housing, health care,
infrastructure, and access to capital make these communities doubly
vulnerable. First, BIPOC and low-income communities suffer more from the
effects of climate change. Many studies and reports document that negative
effects from increased temperatures, rising sea levels, prolonged drought
cycles, and more intense storms and heat waves track racial and class
divides. Second, BIPOC and low-income communities are more vulnerable to
the economic disruption caused by the rapid transition
to zero-carbon sources of energy.
Federal leadership can have a significant
impact on how climate mitigation and
adaptation policies affect BIPOC and lowincome communities. On the mitigation
side, first, the federal government should
adopt a robust strategy to ensure that the
transition to zero-carbon energy sources protects
workers and local economies that have been dependent on
fossil fuels. Second, the federal government should adopt policies to address
longstanding issues of unequal access to energy and electricity. Third, the
federal government should use the energy transition as an opportunity to
reduce both carbon and the pollutants undermining public health in
frontline communities. With regard to adaptation, the federal government
should channel funding and resources directly to frontline and vulnerable
communities.
Recommendation #1: Congress and the president should address the
negative impacts of the rapid shift to a zero-carbon economy on formerly
fossil fuel-dependent communities by enacting Just Transition legislation.
The legislation should prioritize BIPOC and low-income communities, and
include funding for planning processes, worker and community support,
and data collection.
Recommendation #2: Congress and the president should enact legislation
that prioritizes distributed clean energy investments in BIPOC and
environmental justice communities, lowers the energy burden on BIPOC and
low-income communities, and increases opportunities for ownership of
clean energy assets in frontline communities.
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Recommendation #3: Congress and the president should adopt climate
mitigation policies that simultaneously reduce other forms of pollution (copollutants) that adversely impact BIPOC and low-income communities.
Recommendation #4: Congress and the president should provide federal
support and establish climate adaptation parameters to achieve adaptation
justice for BIPOC and low-income communities.

Proposed Policy: Federal Just Transitions Legislation and
Policies
By Sarah Krakoff and Hannah J. Wiseman

Background
To prevent further dangerous effects from climate change, the economy
must rapidly transition away from carbon-based sources of energy and
consumer goods. The largest source of U.S. carbon emissions is the
transportation sector, representing 36 percent of emissions. 89 Electrification
of a substantial portion of the vehicle fleet will therefore be
a necessary component of U.S. climate policy. Close
To prevent further dangerous
behind the transportation sector, at 35 percent of U.S.
effects from climate change, the
emissions is power generation, requiring a move away
economy must rapidly transition
from fossil fuel-fired power plants toward renewable
away from carbon-based
sources of energy and greater energy efficiency.
sources of energy and consumer
goods. The largest source of U.S.
These changes will have major benefits, including job
carbon emissions is the
creation, pollution reduction, the formation of more
transportation sector,
durable and sustainable industries, and the ability to
representing 36 percent of
create opportunities for groups that have previously
emissions. Electrification of a
been underrepresented in economic growth. But if
substantial portion of the
inadequately addressed through public policy, the
vehicle fleet will therefore be a
transition will also produce costs in the form of job
necessary component of U.S.
losses, fewer revenue dollars for governments and
climate policy.
communities previously dependent on fossil fuels, and a
measure of social and economic disruption. These
changes will disproportionately affect BIPOC and low-income
communities; indeed, examples of economic disruption are already evident
in formerly fossil-fuel dependent communities across the country, including
in the Navajo Nation, the Powder River Basin (including the Crow Indian
Tribe), and in West Virginia.

Recommendations
Federal Just Transitions Legislation. The federal government should adopt
legislation that provides funding, resources, and data collection for
communities and individuals most vulnerable to the transition away from

Climate, Energy, Justice

47

fossil fuels. The legislation should prioritize resources for BIPOC and lowincome communities that historically have borne the brunt of negative
impacts from fossil fuel extraction, production, and distribution. A federal
Just Transitions policy could be modeled in part after the Base Realignment
and Closure process, which establishes a commission to set priorities for
base closures and provides community involvement and access to transition
funding. 90
Funding for Community Vision and Planning Processes. Just Transitions
legislation should include grants to communities heavily impacted by and
dependent on fossil-fuel development to allow them to engage in planning
processes to determine their economic futures. Community planning has
already been used to good effect in some former coal-dependent
communities, but federal funding and leadership are necessary to match the
scale of the transition ahead. 91
Funding for Community Economic Growth, Services, and Infrastructure.
Just Transitions legislation should include grants that support the initiatives
identified in communities’ vision and planning processes, including seed
funding for start-ups and similar initiatives geared toward economic
innovation and reinvention; money for critical investment in new
infrastructure and repair of existing infrastructure; and support for essential
community services such as public health offices, schools, and fire and
emergency services during the transition away from fossil fuels.
Funding for Individual Workers Losing Jobs. Workers who lose jobs due to
the decline of fossil fuel development and distribution will need various
forms of support. For those near retirement, pension and health care
support will be required. Workers who remain in the labor force will need
unemployment compensation, job retraining, health care, and relocation
support. In one example of this type of policy tool, New Mexico’s Energy
Transition Act creates a Displaced Workers Assistance Fund, which provides
financial support for job retraining and the costs of participating in
apprenticeship programs, among other provisions. 92 Alberta, Canada’s Coal
and Electricity Transition Tuition Voucher provides workers with up to
CA$12,000 for post-secondary education. 93 In North Rhine-Westphalia,
Germany—a region previously largely dependent on coal mining—Germany
built a large university campus to help train workers and stimulate new
economic development. 94 Federal lawmakers should draw on these and
other examples in designing worker support programs in Just Transitions
legislation.
Data collection and dissemination. Decisionmakers will need information
about which individuals, groups, and communities are harmed and
benefited by the transition, and the nature and degree of the harms and
benefits. They will also require data on the stakeholders most in need of
benefits that will flow from the transition—including those who have
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historically experienced disproportionate burdens such as pollution from
power plants or underrepresentation or inadequate pay in the workforce.
Data collection should not be used as an excuse to delay the deployment of
essential policy tools, but should be an expeditious front-end and
continuing process to identify and prioritize workers and communities
eligible for Just Transitions funding and support. Congress should fund and
help coordinate this data collection effort, ensuring that communities,
states, and non-governmental groups that participate in this effort use
similar metrics and share results through a centralized, uniform database or
similar platform.

Proposed Policy: Federal Support for Energy Justice
By Shalanda H. Baker

Background
BIPOC communities disproportionately bear the twin burdens of
environmental injustice and energy insecurity. People of color are more
likely to live near fossil-fuel generation, and BIPOC households are also more
likely than white households to experience high energy burdens and energy
insecurity. Although state and federal incentives have increased the
penetration of rooftop solar around the country, recent studies show that
communities of color have been left out of the solar energy transition. Even
when controlling for income and home ownership, communities of color are
less likely to have distributed solar energy than white communities. 95 If
utility electricity prices increase, communities of color would therefore be
more likely to bear the cost. Federal policies should aim to address the
environmental and energy burdens facing BIPOC communities, while also
closing the gaps in clean energy access across racial groups.

Recommendations
Prioritize local clean energy investments in BIPOC communities and
environmental justice communities. Distributed energy should form a
cornerstone of the energy transition. Energy efficiency and distributed clean
energy generation in the form of rooftop solar or community-owned solar
can reduce the need to rely on harmful fossil-fuel generation and offer
economic benefits that reduce energy burden and increase energy security.
Federally supported distributed energy legislation should remedy the racial
disparities in rooftop solar adoption by providing targeted funding to
support solar investments in communities of color as well as frontline
environmental justice communities. Legislation should offer incentives for
solar developers to deploy rooftop solar projects in the target communities,
and offer a pathway for target communities to own distributed energy.
Federal funding should also support the identification and retrofitting of
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energy-inefficient housing, and construction of new state-of-the-art housing
and infrastructure in BIPOC and low-income communities.
Decrease energy burden in BIPOC communities and low-income
communities. Energy burden can dictate whether a family eats or keeps the
lights on. Separate studies by the Energy Information Administration and
the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy reveal that lowincome and BIPOC communities in the United States suffer
from extraordinary energy insecurity and energy
In addition to investing in energy
burden. 96 These communities routinely pay more than
efficiency and distributed solar to
the recommended 6 percent of overall household
reduce utility bills, federal energy
income to meet energy needs, and their expenditures
policy should reduce the risk of
are often double or even three-and-a-half times higher
excessive energy burdens by
than the median national energy burden of 3.1
setting a ceiling on the
percent. 97 In the face of high energy burden, the same
percentage low-income
communities face difficult choices as they struggle to
communities must pay. The cap
meet basic household needs. In addition to investing in
would free up household income
energy efficiency and distributed solar to reduce utility
that could help with wealth
bills, federal energy policy should reduce the risk of
creation in BIPOC communities as
excessive energy burdens by setting a ceiling on the
well as local community
percentage low-income communities must pay. The cap
investment.
would free up household income that could help with
wealth creation in BIPOC communities as well as local
community investment.
Accelerate opportunities for ownership of local clean energy assets in
BIPOC communities and communities of color. Renewable energy
development provides a critical pathway for deep decarbonization, but
research shows that deployment of large-scale clean energy can have
disproportionate social and environmental impacts on BIPOC communities,
replicating the inequities of fossil-fuel based development. 98 Renewable
energy deployment must incorporate community economic participation as
well as political participation. These levels of participation will offer
economic benefits to frontline communities and enhance overall
community buy-in of renewable projects. Federal energy policy should
require utility-scale renewable energy developers to include communities as
co-beneficiaries of large renewable projects and include incentives for
communities to develop community-owned utility-scale clean energy
projects. Community benefits should include a requirement for equity
(economic) participation in large-scale project development. This will
enhance the overall economic benefits for low-income, frontline, and BIPOC
communities.
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Proposed Policy: Adopt Climate Policies that Provide CoPollutant Benefits
By Alice Kaswan

Background
The inequalities in policing highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement
are only one among many inequalities experienced by BIPOC communities
across the country. Decades of evidence demonstrates that environmental
harms, including air pollution, are disproportionately located in frontline and
vulnerable communities, a consequence of our history of segregation,
zoning laws, and political and economic exclusion. 99
While greenhouse gases themselves do not have significant localized
impacts, most emission sources emit locally harmful co-pollutants alongside
greenhouse gases. Congress’s first priority among a range of climate options
should be strategies that achieve the most benefits, including public health
benefits. Similarly, Congress should avoid or de-prioritize strategies with
negative public health consequences.

Recommendations
Use carbon pricing as a backstop and revenue-generator, not as a firstorder strategy. Many BIPOC communities have raised significant concerns
about carbon pricing strategies. In addition to skepticism about their
efficacy in sparking fundamental change, community
activists argue that, because market mechanisms leave
Community activists argue that,
emissions decisions to industry, individual facilities and
because market mechanisms
companies can maintain or increase emissions, so long as
leave emissions decisions to
they are willing to pay. Consequently, pricing mechanisms
industry, individual facilities and
could perpetuate or worsen pollution in frontline
companies can maintain or
communities, depriving them of the public health coincrease emissions, so long as
benefits they would have obtained if these facilities had
they are willing to pay.
decreased their GHG emissions.
Consequently, pricing
mechanisms could perpetuate
At the same time, carbon pricing has certain virtues. The
or worsen pollution in frontline
cap in a cap-and-trade program or the tax rate in a carbon
communities, depriving them of
tax can provide a steady emission reduction incentive—
the public health co-benefits
and backstop—if more direct policies have gaps and are
they would have obtained if
implemented too slowly. Moreover, by requiring polluters
these facilities had decreased
to pay, carbon pricing programs create a revenue stream
their GHG emissions.
that can help finance an equitable clean energy transition.
The backbone of U.S. climate strategies should be a vision for
a clean and equitable transition coupled with intentionally designed climate
strategies that maximize public health and welfare benefits. Carbon pricing
should complement more direct strategies rather than the other way
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around. Direct requirements and programs to reduce industrial and mobile
source emissions could reduce pollution hot spots and reduce emissions
broadly. If carbon pricing is implemented in addition to, rather than instead
of, more targeted pollution-reducing strategies, carbon pricing will not
undermine opportunities to improve public health.
Prioritize reductions in industries causing the most pollution. Congress
should direct relevant federal and state agencies to design climate strategies
that address the longstanding public health threats experienced in frontline
communities. For industry, policymakers could prioritize achieving
greenhouse gas reductions from the industries with the highest co-pollutant
intensity, that is, those that generate the most pollution per unit of carbon.
Policymakers could also prioritize greenhouse gas and associated copollutant reductions from the industries causing the greatest public health
risks due to their location in dense and vulnerable population centers. For
example, in California and elsewhere, refineries are disproportionately
located in low-income communities of color. Federal requirements that
states develop climate strategies to reduce industry emissions where they
would reap the greatest co-pollutant benefits could accomplish this goal. To
avoid undue disruption and potential cross-border emissions leakage, the
affected industries may require support, either directly or in the form of
border adjustments.
Avoid climate strategies that could cause more pollution. Policymakers
should give a lower priority to carbon reduction strategies that increase
harmful co-pollutants. For example, although biofuels are considered lowercarbon than fossil fuels because plant material absorbs carbon prior to
combustion (creating a neutral carbon cycle), burning biofuels can create
harmful co-pollutants. Locating biofuel facilities in or near frontline
communities, where they would contribute to greater pollution for
residents, would intensify their adverse impacts. In addition, carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS) mechanisms, which capture carbon from fossil fuel
combustion and then transport the carbon for long-term storage, could,
according to some studies, increase co-pollutant air and water emissions, in
part because CCS is itself energy-intensive. 100
Eliminate or substantially reduce diesel pollution. Because diesel
emissions present particularly significant climate and public health threats,
policymakers should prioritize research and controls to eliminate them. 101
Diesel emissions generate “black carbon,” essentially particulate matter that
exacerbates global warming by absorbing heat, whether airborne or
deposited. In addition, diesel particulates present high risks to public health.
In a 1998 study, California’s health assessment agency estimated that diesel
exhaust causes 70 percent of cancer risk from air toxics in the state. 102
Children riding diesel school buses, and frontline communities living close
to ports, highways, and warehouse districts are likely to experience
disproportionate exposure to diesel pollution.
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Requiring manufacturers to sell zero-emission trucks and equipment would
spur technological innovation and the supply of zero-emission options.
Requiring owners of bus and truck fleets, shipyards, and farms to utilize zero
emission trucks and equipment would spur demand. Funds for research and
development, as well as subsidies for manufacturers and equipment
purchasers, may be necessary to avoid excessive disruption in these sectors.
Target transportation improvements to frontline communities.
Emissions from passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses are a major source of
both carbon and traditional pollutants. Targeting transportation resources
to frontline communities is the only way to spread the benefits of transit,
sustainable development, and zero-emission vehicles to communities and
individuals that would otherwise be unable to afford them. Because many of
these communities suffer from disproportionate levels of air pollution,
targeting public transportation and zero-emission resources in these
communities would also provide out-sized public health benefits.

Proposed Policy: Provide Federal Support and Adaptation
Parameters to Achieve Adaptation Justice
By Alice Kaswan

Background and Context
Climate change is already here, causing more frequent and intense floods,
fires, extreme heat, and other impacts. As much as we work to reduce
emissions, we will simultaneously have to adapt to the changes humaninduced climate change has already wrought. Adaptation will not be the
same for everyone. 103 Vulnerability to climate change is strongly correlated
with race, class, age, and other demographic factors. Three variables shape
the full experience: physical exposure, sensitivity to harm, and the capacity
to cope. Low-income populations and people of color face particular
challenges under all of these factors.
Although the wealthy may disproportionately face particular risks, like
coastal erosion affecting beach houses, for example, socioeconomically
challenged communities are likely to face greater physical exposure in many
contexts, including living on lower-valued land at risk of flooding or in a
dense urban setting subject to the heat-island effect, as well as working in
exposed occupations like agriculture and construction. Socioeconomic
factors can also affect sensitivity to harm, which is determined by underlying
health conditions (themselves shaped by access to healthy food and health
care), housing conditions, access to air conditioning and the money to pay
for it, and the like. Lastly, the capacity to cope in the long-term is critical, a
factor shaped by savings, home insurance, access to government benefits,
and geographic mobility.
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For indigenous populations, including Alaska Natives and Tribes throughout
the continental United States, climate change impacts present existential
threats to entire cultures. Native American identity and culture are uniquely
tied to place, and as climate change eats away at the land, whether through
coastal flooding or unsustainable drought, community life and cultural
integrity are threatened. Tribal governments are also at risk, and adaptation
planning must include respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
Climate change will also cause hidden and indirect impacts. Analysts
estimate that, by 2100, as many as 13 million people could be directly
impacted by sea-level rise alone, and could, potentially, migrate in
response. 104 In the long-term, as people migrate away from areas most
impacted by climate change (in the United States and
elsewhere), “receiving communities” will accommodate
Effective adaptation will require
in-migration. Communities that might not perceive
advance planning rather than
current climate risks need to be prepared for future
reactive and piecemeal decisionimpacts on housing availability and affordability,
making. Opportunities for
increased infrastructure needs, and all of the other
meaningful participation,
consequences, positive and potentially negative, of an
including people who have been
expanding population.
historically marginalized, will be
critical.

Effective adaptation will require advance planning rather
than reactive and piecemeal decision-making.
Opportunities for meaningful participation, including people
who have been historically marginalized, will be critical.
Although most adaptation decisions will be made at the state and local
levels where impacts are immediately experienced, federal law can
nonetheless play a significant role. Federal funding will be essential to help
state and local governments prepare and respond. And as the federal
government provides funding, it can establish planning parameters and
conditions that help achieve adaptation justice.

Recommendations
Continue to fund federal research on climate impacts, with explicit
attention to impacts on the nation’s most vulnerable populations. In
addition to considering those directly impacted, the federal government
should begin research on potential migration pathways and potential
impacts on receiving communities, with explicit attention to the most
vulnerable migrants and receiving communities.
Maintain a federal adaptation clearinghouse for addressing climate
risks, and, within that clearinghouse, highlight strategies for addressing
risks to the most vulnerable populations. In addition, the federal
government should adopt an affirmative program to disseminate
information to states, local governments, and non-profit organizations and
help support their implementation efforts.
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Require local adaptation planning, integrated with state and local
hazard mitigation planning. The planning requirements should:
•

•

Explicitly require assessment of demographics and particular
vulnerabilities in differing populations, including such factors as access
to air-conditioning, transportation options, need for shelter in the event
of evacuation, and other factors relevant to local climate risks.
Require development of a participation plan that includes mechanisms
to ensure the meaningful engagement of frontline communities in light
of local demographics and communication modes, including
interpretation and outreach through non-governmental entities.

Establish parameters for how communities facing climate risks choose
among their three central response options: (1) protection from climate
impacts (e.g., flood gates; new water supply sources); (2) increased resiliency
(e.g., housing code updates, like elevation requirements); and (3) retreat.
Retreat may be the only option for areas at great risk, but other options are
possible in some contexts. Parameters include:
For Native American Tribes and indigenous communities, robust
consultation and free, prior, informed consent before any decision to
retreat. Where retreat is the only option, allow for tribally driven decisions
about relocation sites and provide support for maintaining tribal selfgovernance throughout the process.
•

•

To the degree the federal government provides funding for “managed
retreat,” including buy-outs to help those who are most in harm’s way,
federal funding should include parameters that reduce the potential for
buy-out abuse.
Where there are alternatives to retreat, the federal government should
require a showing that buy-out decisions are not driven solely by land
value (disadvantaging poorer neighborhoods) and that buy-outs of lowincome and of-color communities are justified by unacceptable risk and
not being used as indirect exclusionary tools.

Prioritize federal adaptation funding for Tribes, communities and
households with the greatest need, including both sending and
receiving communities. For example, hazard mitigation funding should go
to lower-income communities and households, and funding to support
affordable housing should be provided to receiving communities.

Conclusion
Climate change is affecting communities throughout the nation right now.
Fires raging in the west and storms repeatedly battering the gulf coast are
2020's climate tragedies. Others are in motion or soon to come, including
long-term drought, rising sea levels, and extreme heat events. The energy
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transition is also already under way, though it is not happening as rapidly as
it must. Federal lawmakers should seize on this pivotal moment to address
climate change and also redress longstanding inequality and injustice for
BIPOC and low-income communities. Just transitions legislation, energy
justice legislation, and policies for mitigation and adaptation that prioritize
frontline and vulnerable communities would go a long way toward ensuring
that the climate crisis does not become a deeply unequal humanitarian
crisis.
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Governance Mechanisms and the Climate Crisis
By Daniel Farber, Victor Flatt, Alice Kaswan, Joel A. Mintz, and Joseph Tomain

Summary
Congress and federal agencies implementing climate legislation will face a
wide range of policy choices as they seek the best set of strategies to reduce
emissions. No single strategy alone will solve the crisis. Congress should
consider climate-related governance mechanisms that cut across existing
regulatory programs, develop climate-specific regulations, and strengthen
basic agency functions. In this paper, Center for Progressive Reform (CPR)
Member Scholars offer their expertise on a few key mechanisms.
Recommendation 1: Research and Development. To build technological
capacity to achieve decarbonization, robust
federal funding for research and development
is essential. While the private sector
continues research and investment in
alternative energy and efficiency
technologies, federal support will enable
continued innovation in promising
options that remain too speculative for
private investment.
Recommendation 2: Social Cost of Carbon. On the regulatory side,
Congress faces a plethora of choices. A scientifically defensible financial
estimate of climate impacts, the “social cost of carbon” is key to integrating
potential climate impacts into regulatory decisions across the federal
government. The social cost of carbon could also provide a reference point if
Congress decides to establish a carbon tax or other pricing mechanism.
Recommendation 3: Carbon Pricing Options. The role of carbon pricing in
federal climate legislation is itself a critical question. We present several
factors that are critical to the choice between two common carbon pricing
mechanisms: a carbon tax, like those seen in recent congressional bills, and
cap-and-trade, the form adopted by a number of states.
Recommendation 4: The Limited Role of Carbon Pricing. Although a
carbon price has a role to play, Congress should develop a more
comprehensive and visionary decarbonization strategy that includes but is
not limited to carbon pricing.
Recommendation 5: Strong Enforcement Mechanisms. Climate mitigation
strategies will only work if they are effectively implemented and enforced.
Congress should ensure that EPA’s enforcement resources and substantive
enforcement policies will lead to widespread compliance and real progress
on the path to decarbonization.
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Proposed Policy: Federal Funding for Clean Energy
Research & Development
By Joseph Tomain

Background
Clean energy research and development (R&D) is consistent with past
government investments such as the Manhattan Project, Project Apollo and,
now, finding a COVID-19 vaccine. At the same time, it also has distinct
characteristics. Clean energy research does not have a specific target. There
is no silver bullet that will help us transition from a dirty fossil fuel energy
economy to a clean one. Instead, clean energy R&D requires a full-scale
partnership between the federal government and the private sector, with
each sector playing a specific role in furtherance of one goal – the marketing
and commercialization of new technologies.
R&D investments occur along a continuum from basic science and
technology through marketing and commercialization. At the basic science
and technology stage, government is heavily, and most often exclusively,
involved because the private sector does not want to take on the financial
risk of failure. Similarly, government finances the demonstration projects
needed to take a concept off the drawing boards and into the world. After
demonstration, private sector corporations take over the marketing and
commercialization of new technologies, and they reap the financial rewards.
Most R&D is performed by the Department of Energy, which oversees its
own R&D programs, as well as 17 national laboratories that are dispersed
throughout the United States. Historically, most of the research conducted
by these laboratories was for defense purposes. Today, defense is still the
primary focus for many of these labs; however, energy innovation is
attracting increased government funding.
The key DOE R&D arm is the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy
(ARPA-E), which, since its inception, has provided approximately $2.3 billion
in R&D funding for more than 800 potentially transformational energy
technology projects. ARPA-E has funded small businesses, universities, large
corporations, and federal research and development centers, as well as
nonprofit organizations.
ARPA-E operates two significant initiatives. Energy Innovation Hubs bring
together top scientists and engineers from the academy, industry, and
government to overcome known barriers to technological innovation and to
reduce the time from laboratory innovation to technological development
then to commercialization. By way of example, the Joint Center for Energy
Storage Research (JCESR) is dedicated to improving energy storage with the
goal of having 25 percent of all electricity consumed in the United States
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generated by solar and wind by 2025. The United States also operates 46
Energy Frontier Research Centers (EFRCs) that consist of partnerships among
universities, national laboratories, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit
firms. EFRCs have successfully funded research on solar panels, lithium
batteries, LED lighting, wind turbines, smart grid technologies, appliances,
transportation, carbon capture, and innovative nuclear energy
technologies. 105
The private sector is eager for clean energy investments. Despite the COVID
crisis, global investment in clean energy for the first half of 2020 increased 5
percent, continuing a years-long trend. These investments are paying off.
Renewable energy is producing more electric power than coal-fired power
plants in 2020; 106 the private sector is investing in nuclear fusion; 107 solar
and wind dominates new generation; 108 and as renewable stocks
outperform fossil fuels, financial advisors are recommending buy orders for
renewables. 109
Despite private involvement in clean energy, additional
federal R&D investments are needed to lay the
groundwork for subsequent private development. More
research is needed across many clean energy options,
including local and utility-scale solar, on-shore and offshore wind, the smart grid, electric vehicles and their
charging infrastructure, nuclear fusion, energy storage,
large- and small-scale battery configurations, artificial
intelligence, small modular nuclear units, bioenergy, and
new materials. Research is needed not only on individual
options, but on the synergies among energy
technologies. Investments in the smart grid could, for
example, synchronize with investments in artificial
intelligence, electric vehicles, recharging stations, and affordable and lighter
weight batteries.

Renewable energy is producing
more electric power than coalfired power plants in 2020; the
private sector is investing in
nuclear fusion; solar and wind
dominates new generation; and
as renewable stocks outperform
fossil fuels, financial advisors are
recommending buy orders for
renewables.

Recommendation
Congress should continue to provide robust R&D funding. Government and
private investors acknowledge the importance of clean energy and the
reality of the transition. The Trump administration is notorious for its
antipathy toward science and has proffered budget proposals to zero out
ARPA-E. It is notable that Congress has resisted these budget proposals.
Looking forward, Congress and future administrations should continue, if
not increase, their support for ARPA-E.
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Proposed Policy: Reevaluate the Social Cost of Carbon
By Daniel Farber

Background
For the past 40 years, cost-benefit analysis has played a critical role in the
process of issuing regulations. To be valid, that analysis must take climate
change into account. Doing so requires estimating the social cost of carbon
– the harm done by the emission of a single ton of carbon dioxide or the
equivalent amount of another greenhouse gas such as methane.
Estimates of the social cost of carbon are important for other reasons. They
can benchmark the right level for a carbon tax or the price level in a carbon
trading system. The social cost of carbon can also provide a way of
communicating to policymakers and the public the benefits of cutting
carbon emissions.
In response to a federal court ruling requiring agencies to take in account
the social cost of carbon, the Obama administration assembled an
interagency working group to provide an estimate for use by all government
agencies. The estimate was based on three leading economic models and
was subjected to careful peer review. The resulting estimate was used
throughout the government under Obama and also won recognition from
state and foreign governments for its credibility. The Obama
administration’s estimate was upheld by a federal appeals court. 110
President Trump rescinded this estimate. He ordered agencies to produce
their own estimates and emphasized that they should follow normal
guidelines that discourage inclusion of costs to foreign countries. The
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the EPA have since adopted the
same estimates, which are around 85 percent below the Obama
administration’s estimates. The Obama administration estimated that a ton
of carbon emitted in 2020 caused $42 in damage, whereas the Trump
administration’s estimate was $7. The difference is largely due to ignoring all
harm U.S. emissions cause outside of our own borders, but the use of a
higher discount rate (lowering the weight placed on future harm) was also
significant. These changes were made without peer review.
In a recent ruling, a federal district court found the Trump administration’s
analysis to be “riddled with flaws.” 111 As the court pointed out, BLM had
simply ignored studies by economists supporting global damages and
showing that estimates limited to individual regions such as the United
States are unreliable. The court also pointed out that BLM had ignored the
impacts of climate change on Americans living abroad and on U.S. trade.
Thus, the administration had failed to give a reasoned argument for
changing direction.
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Recommendations
Cost-benefit analysis has its critics, including a number of CPR Member
Scholars. This is not the place to reprise that debate. As long as the
government continues to use cost-benefit analysis, however, it should
certainly include full consideration of the environmental benefits of
regulation. We advocate no more than using the best available methods for
doing so.
In the short term, restore the Obama administration's estimate of the
social cost of carbon. The Trump administration’s estimate rests on a flimsy
scientific basis. It has chosen to ignore recommendations by the National
Academies of Sciences 112 for improving estimates of the social cost of
carbon. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has warned that
without paying heed to the NAS recommendations and current economics
research, government estimates may be scientifically flawed. 113 The GAO
also found that the economic models that the Trump administration used
“were not premised or calibrated to provide estimates of the social cost of
carbon based on domestic damages.”
Given the significant questions about the integrity of the science behind the
Trump administration’s estimates, the Obama administration’s estimates
should be reinstated across all agencies as an immediate interim measure.
In the longer-term, update the social cost of carbon estimate. To prevent
future backsliding, key requirements for the social cost of carbon should be
enacted into law by Congress and incorporated into binding regulations by
agencies like EPA. New rules for determining the social cost of carbon should
adopt a precautionary approach, incorporating the four principles listed
below.
•

Principle 1: Because climate change requires a global response, the
social cost of carbon should be based on global impacts, not merely
impacts within the boundaries of the United States.
The Trump administration was wrong to limit the analysis to climate
impacts within the United States. American interests are intertwined with
the state of the rest of the world, a fact that was obvious even before the
global pandemic. Moreover, limiting future climate impacts within the
United States will require global cooperation. We cannot expect other
nations to cooperate with us if we give their interests zero weight in our
own climate policies.

•

Principle 2: To give appropriate weight to the interests of future
generations, a low discount rate should be used in determining the
social cost of carbon.
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The incredibly long-lasting effects of carbon emissions will
dramatically impact future generations. Using a high discount rate
essentially ignores much of the devastation our actions will cause.
When the Obama administration estimated the social cost of carbon
associated with a range of potential discount rates, it came to only
$12 per ton with a 5 percent discount rate, but increased by a factor
of five with a 2.5 percent discount rate because lower discount rate
gives much more weight to long-term harms. 114 At the Obama
administration’s preferred 3 percent discount rate, the social cost of
carbon estimate is three-and-a-half times as high as with the 5
percent level. In contrast, the Trump administration estimated the
social cost of carbon using a 3 percent rate and a 7 percent rate,
reducing the social cost of carbon to $1 per ton at the higher rate.
•

Principle 3: Because of uncertainties about the future extent of climate
change and impacts on human society, the social cost of
carbon should give substantial weight to the risk of
Sound policy also requires giving
catastrophic outcomes.
weight to the very real possibility
that climate change may be worse
Sound policy also requires giving weight to the very real
than expected. Scientists are
possibility that climate change may be worse than
confident of the reality of climate
expected. Scientists are confident of the reality of climate
change and have made progress in
change and have made progress in estimating its future
estimating its future severity, but
severity, but the possibility of much worse outcomes
the possibility of much worse
cannot be excluded. Such outcomes would have
outcomes cannot be excluded.
disastrous effects on society, and the social cost of
carbon should take that risk into account.
•

Principle 4: The process for determining the social cost of carbon should
involve peer review and use the best available economic modeling and
data.
Admittedly, any estimate of the social cost of carbon will be imprecise.
But we can at least make our best effort to take climate impacts into
account by requiring experts to review the analysis and by employing
high-quality data and methods. The Trump administration has failed to
observe these obvious requirements. We should ensure that the same
mistakes are not made by future administrations.
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Proposed Policy: Parameters for Choosing and Designing a
Carbon Pricing Mechanism
By Victor Flatt

Background
According to the World Bank’s 2018 carbon pricing report, more than 70
jurisdictions around the world, including China, have some form of nationallevel direct carbon pricing, usually applying to all greenhouse gases (GHGs),
with non-carbon GHGs converted into their carbon equivalents. Economists
are virtually unanimous in their claims that carbon pricing is an efficient and
important strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. California
already has an economy-wide carbon price (through a cap and trade
system), the northeastern states have a cap and trade program applicable to
the electricity sector, and other jurisdictions around the world with carbon
pricing programs are planning on strengthening them by applying border
adjustment taxes (BAT) on products which come from countries without
similar mechanisms. All of this suggests that the United States will be under
pressure to pursue some kind of federal carbon pricing mechanism in the
near future.
Policymakers can choose among many possible mechanisms for reducing
greenhouse gases. Although not the only possible or even a preferred
strategy, implementation of a direct carbon pricing strategy can
complement and work in tandem with other policy solutions. (Alice Kaswan
discusses the importance of non-pricing measures in her contribution to this
paper.)
One common type of carbon pricing is a direct Pigouvian tax on greenhouse
gas emissions, usually imposed on major polluters and, potentially, on
upstream sources of carbon, like oil and gas distributors. The other common
pricing system is cap and trade, wherein the government sets a long-term
target and then establishes decreasing emissions caps and auctions off or
otherwise distributes emission allowances. Polluters can buy, trade, and sell
their emissions allowances, so long as they hold sufficient allowances to
cover their actual emissions. A cap and trade program’s carbon price is
generated by the allowances’ market price.
Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas cap and trade schemes can be set up to
be roughly equivalent in terms of impact on emissions and money raised
from the tax or sale of emissions rights. The choice between a carbon tax
and a cap and trade system depends on many factors. Both can be used to
generate revenue, and both can be used to curb emissions.
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Recommendations
In designing a program and choosing between a carbon tax and cap-andtrade, Congress should address the following factors:
Any federal carbon pricing system needs to be understandable and not
too complex. Attempting to achieve multiple policy goals by controlling
emissions distributions, developing complex offset provisions, and creating
nuanced allowance allocation or tax rate provisions could increase
complexity.
Congress must address the tradeoff between certainty in carbon prices
and certainty in achieving emissions reductions. Because taxes provide a
transparent and, presumably, stable price, they provide the regulated sector
with more certainty with respect to price of emissions. The more stable price
also allows government to better predict likely revenue. However, taxes do
not control overall emissions, leading to uncertainty in emissions levels.
In contrast, by setting a clear cap, presumably descending over time, a welldesigned cap and trade system would provide more certainty as to
emissions reductions. However, emissions prices will depend on demand,
and so prices could be quite uncertain.
The pricing scheme should be politically feasible. Though taxes were a
dirty word the last time the United States took up the attempt to craft a
greenhouse gas reduction law, taxes may be more politically feasible in the
current political environment, particularly given the need for more federal
revenue.
Any pricing scheme should establish long-term parameters to increase
predictability for business and to avoid future attempts for stakeholders
to seek out individualized benefits that don’t benefit the program as a
whole. Thus, the cap in a cap and trade system should be designed to
decline on a predicted path of at least 20 years. Under a carbon tax, the
increasing tax should be specified for at least 20 years.
A new federal pricing scheme should account for existing domestic and
international programs. That might suggest cap and trade over a carbon
tax, as most of the existing programs in the rest of the world are in the form
of cap and trade. Any two cap and trade systems can be linked with the
agreement of the sovereigns, but there may also be accounting mechanisms
that would allow a federal carbon tax to be compatible with existing global
cap and trade programs. This might work by converting taxes paid into
carbon dioxide equivalents based on a market price in a cap and trade
system. However, this also increases complexity.
Undoubtedly, the politics and optics of cap-and-trade and a carbon tax will
also play a role in the choice between the two. Nonetheless, depending
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upon design, cap-and-trade and a carbon tax could achieve equivalent
greenhouse gas reductions. Whichever option Congress or the next
administration chooses, they can amplify or ameliorate the advantages and
disadvantages of these mechanisms by careful attention to the foregoing
parameters.

Proposed Policy: Carbon Pricing Should Not Supplant
Visionary Strategies for Transitioning to a Clean Energy
Economy
By Alice Kaswan

Background
Congressional proposals, state initiatives, and environmental advocacy
groups have recently featured carbon taxes, possibly with a dividend back to
consumers, as an efficient greenhouse gas reduction strategy that would
achieve climate goals at the lowest cost. Meanwhile, several
states, including those participating in the Regional
Although some form of carbon
Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California, have already
pricing is necessary to encourage
adopted some form of a cap-and-trade program, which
reductions and create revenue,
sets an overall cap on emissions and then allows
federal climate legislation should
regulated entities to buy and sell allowances to cover
provide a more visionary
their emissions. (In his contribution to this paper, Victor
roadmap for accomplishing a
Flatt provides a sense of the parameters that could affect
clean energy transition, with a
policymakers’ choice between a tax or cap-and-trade
carbon price complementing
program.) A key question is: Considering the wide array of
that vision.
available climate mitigation strategies, what role should
carbon pricing, in any form, play?

Recommendation
Although some form of carbon pricing is necessary to encourage reductions
and create revenue, federal climate legislation should provide a more
visionary roadmap for accomplishing a clean energy transition, with a
carbon price complementing that vision.
A carbon price relies on private actors to make carbon reduction decisions
based on a price signal. This leads to fragmented and uncoordinated
actions. Given the scale of our decarbonization challenge and its
implications for our energy infrastructure, institutional structures for energy
development and deployment, transportation, manufacturing, buildings,
land use, and more, we need a coordinated strategy to accomplish a
coherent, effective, and just transition.
In addition, by relying on the piecemeal and short-term decisions of private
actors to achieve reductions, a carbon price alone fails to provide a larger
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vision for a clean economy. A clean economy could take a variety of forms,
all of which have important societal, environmental, and legal implications.
Will we encourage decentralized electricity or maintain our centralized
structure? How will we develop the transmission infrastructure needed to
move renewable energy to population centers? When and how should we
deploy alternatives to fossil fuels in the transportation sector? Who will
benefit and who will be harmed? Will control shift from current owners to
new entrepreneurs? What will this mean for our existing regulatory
frameworks at the federal and state levels? Federal climate legislation should
grapple with these central questions and, as appropriate, provide a
framework for states to engage in thoughtful and inclusive planning.
The lack of vision associated with a carbon price could also impede its
political viability. Although industry might be attracted to what they
perceive as a less expensive approach, a carbon price focuses on the cost
side, not the benefit side, of a clean energy transition. A more
comprehensive set of climate change strategies shows what can be
achieved and how citizens, workers, industry, and agriculture can transition
to a more sustainable future. Recent efforts to adopt carbon pricing in
Washington State and Oregon failed, 115 while more substantive and
visionary policies have been enacted in states across the country, including
Washington State, New York, New Mexico, Maine, Colorado, Virginia, North
Carolina, and more. 116
Comprehensive strategies, at the federal, state, and local level, will also allow
policymakers to identify measures that maximize overall benefits, including
but not limited to greenhouse gas reduction benefits, and reduce potential
costs. For example, strategies that simultaneously reduce co-pollutants in
polluted areas will increase benefits, while strategies that might increase copollutants in polluted areas, like some combustion of some biofuels, might
impose environmental and public health costs. Planning can control for
these effects; a carbon price would not.
A carbon price also has implications for our democracy. By deferring to
private sector decisions, carbon prices preclude democratic deliberation.
Although a carbon price should be a part of any climate mitigation strategy,
it should complement a more engaged and systematic reckoning with the
future.

Proposed Policy: Effective EPA Enforcement
By Joel A. Mintz

Background
Without industry compliance, federal climate legislation will fail. Vigorous,
fair, and even-handed EPA enforcement will be a critical element in assuring
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such compliance. It is also needed to redress the unfair burdens that climate
change places on low-wealth communities, including many communities of
color. Unfortunately, over the past three-and-a-half years, EPA’s enforcement
capability has been significantly diminished. To reinvigorate the agency’s
flagging enforcement efforts and allow it to effectively enforce climate
change legislation, climate legislation should ensure that the agency has
adequate financial and staff resources and is armed with substantive
provisions that will give it the tools it needs to make sure that everyone is
following the laws on the books.

Recommendations
Resources: Enforcement Funding and Recruitment
Increase EPA’s budget appropriations to enable full staffing. Due to
budget cuts, low staff morale, and the retirement of a large cohort of “baby
boomers,” EPA’s staff declined by 12.2 percent between
December 2016 and December 2019 – a loss of 1,993 fullA need to enforce new
time equivalent positions – with experienced senior staff
greenhouse gas emission
overrepresented in those losses. The workforce of the
limitations will substantially
agency’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance
increase the strain on EPA’s
Assurance (OECA) was especially hard-hit, declining by
already undersized,
15.7 percent during the first 20 months of the Trump
overburdened career
administration. A need to enforce new greenhouse gas
enforcement staff. It is
emission limitations will substantially increase the strain
imperative that future federal
on EPA’s already undersized, overburdened career
climate change legislation
enforcement staff. It is imperative that future federal
include significant increases in
climate change legislation include significant increases
EPA’s budget so the agency can
in EPA’s budget so the agency can increase its
increase its enforcement staff to
enforcement staff to needed levels.
needed levels.
Establish (and fund) an EPA program focused on
recruiting and training the enhanced, skillful, and nimble
professional staff that will be needed to enforce limits on greenhouse gas
emissions. Environmental enforcement is a far more complex and
sophisticated activity than may be evident at first blush. Therefore, to
rebuild the agency, Congress must press EPA to recruit an outstanding new
cohort of enforcement staffers and train them well for their critically
important work.
Substantive Enforcement Provisions
Include strong and effective enforcement provisions. Enforcement
provisions in existing environmental statutes vary in their effectiveness.
Future climate change legislation should include enforcement sections
modeled on the most robust regulatory enforcement mechanisms currently
in effect.
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Require EPA to resume meaningful oversight of state and environmental
agency enforcement programs and provide grants to improve state
enforcement programs. Under most federal environmental programs,
states play a critical role in permitting and enforcement, and federal climate
legislation will presumably continue this pattern. Regrettably, many states
lack the resources, expertise, and/or political will to enforce environmental
standards adequately. Federal funding and oversight are essential but have
dramatically decreased during the last few years. Congress should
significantly increase funding for State and Tribal Assistance Grants. In
addition, Congress should direct EPA to resume a diligent, effective
oversight role of state enforcement efforts.
Expressly allow and encourage both EPA and the U.S. Department of
Justice to use Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) in settling
federal enforcement actions against entities that violate greenhouse gas
emission limits. When agencies settle an enforcement case with a violator,
they not only impose penalties, but often include Supplemental
Environmental Projects that provide a tangible environmental or health
benefit to the public and have a direct connection to the polluter's
violations. Although the Trump administration’s Department of Justice
actively discouraged their use, SEPs have a long and proven record of
environmental success. In the climate context, they could be used to
encourage non-complying emitters of greenhouse gases to plant trees,
preserve lakes and wetlands, and set aside tracts of land to serve as
greenhouse gas “sinks.”
Include an effective citizen suit provision in any new climate change
legislation. Citizen suits and/or citizen petitions are a feature of almost
every major federal environmental statute. They are an important safeguard
against lax federal and state enforcement and have been used successfully
to force governmental compliance with rulemaking deadlines and to redress
non-compliance by industrial and municipal pollution sources. A new
federal climate change statute should expressly allow citizens to bring suit
for past violations and allow an award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing or
partially prevailing citizen plaintiffs. Congress should also avoid including
diligent prosecution provisions that open the door to “sweetheart deals”
between polluters and state and federal agencies that effectively forestall
citizen suits.
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Structural Considerations for Climate
Governance
By William W. Buzbee, Alejandro E. Camacho, Robert L. Glicksman, Alice
Kaswan, Dave Owen, and Karen Sokol

Summary
Analysis of the success or failure of regulatory programs often focuses on
their substantive merits or the procedures that govern their implementation.
But the fate of a regulatory program may be driven as much by structural
considerations as by its substantive or procedural aspects. Policymakers in
the United States have long focused largely on one structural aspect of
regulation – federalism. Congress’s allocations of authority between the
federal and state governments – often referred to as the cooperative
federalism features of environmental regulation – have worked reasonably
well in some contexts. In others, however, legislators’ failure to attend to a
wider range of structural dimensions has led to allocations of government
authority that are less likely to achieve statutory objectives and promote
effective, fair, and accountable government.
Congress has the opportunity to avoid similar mistakes in crafting a new
regulatory regime to address the core threats from the climate crisis. By
recognizing and differentiating among three dimensions of regulatory
authority, and by carefully tailoring allocations of
authority to perform different government
functions, Congress can adopt regulatory
programs that reflect a careful balance of the
policy values implicated in climate change
governance. Congress should consider not
only the tradeoffs of assigning authority to
either states or the federal government, but
also the tradeoffs of (1) varying the level of
centralization by governmental function; (2)
configurations that assign overlapping federal and state roles for
particular government functions, as well as overlapping roles for various
federal agencies; and (3) altering the amount and type of coordination
between federal and state authorities (and among federal agencies).
Based on the expanded array of structural choices that these dimensional
and functional allocation choices present, we make the following
recommendations for legislation to address climate change:
Recommendation 1: Congress should consider the differential risks raised
by climate change mitigation, adaptation, and geoengineering in
structuring governance.
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•

•

•

For adaptation, the combination of mostly localized harms and benefits
suggests (1) a primarily decentralized infrastructure for most
governmental functions, (2) limited overlapping authority (with federal
primacy) of key functions, such as standard setting to exploit redundancy
while minimizing inefficiencies, and (3) inter-jurisdictional coordination
to help manage cross-jurisdictional effects.
For mitigation, the combination of global or local environmental benefits
and localized harms apt to result point generally to (1) centralized
standard setting, supplemented by state and local authority; (2)
overlapping state and federal authority for functions for which safety net
advantages are important; and (3) independent authority for functions
such as standard setting and enforcement, but coordinated mechanisms
for functions such as research funding and information dissemination to
promote efficiency.
For geoengineering, the catastrophic global harms that may result from
unilateral deployment by an actor spurred by local environmental or
economic benefits generally suggests (1) centralized control of research
and deployment, (2) overlapping authority to create a safety net to guard
against imprudent deployment, and (3) international coordination to
minimize deployment by solitary institutions.

Recommendation 2: The experience in U.S. environmental law over the past
fifty years suggests that:
•

•

•

Combining federal primacy over certain governmental functions (like
financing, information dissemination, and standard setting) with state
primacy over others (like planning, implementation, and enforcement)
helps leverage the advantages of centralized and decentralized
authority.
Overlapping authority is a good fit for functions that risk underregulation or regulatory capture, such as standard-setting or
enforcement, while more distinct authority for functions such as
information generation and information dissemination is useful in
achieving economies of scale and avoiding wasteful duplication.
Congress should rely on different types of intergovernmental
coordination when it seeks to pool regulator expertise, harmonize
regulation, or reduce the risk of a regulatory race to the bottom, but also
provide independent authority for functions such as standard setting to
promote intergovernmental competition or avoid the risk of regulator
groupthink.

Recommendation 3: Congress should restore California’s authority to
establish emissions controls on greenhouse gas emissions that are more
stringent than those established by EPA, as well as other states’ authority to
adopt California’s standards. It should do so by reversing the agency rule
preempting California’s authority to set GHG standards and by reversing
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EPA’s revocation in 2019 of California’s waiver authority or by lightening
California’s burden of justifying future waivers, or both. Such action would
avoid needlessly sacrificing the advantages of decentralized, overlapping,
and independent regulatory authority and preserve a powerful weapon in
the fight against climate change and deadly air pollution.
Recommendation 4: Congress should establish a strong federal role in
climate mitigation where appropriate, including establishing national
greenhouse gas reduction goals, a national carbon pricing system, and
mobile source emission control requirements. The federal government
should also invest in research and development, as well as provide financial
resources to state and local governments for planning and implementation
of mitigation and adaptation measures.
Recommendation 5: Congress should establish strong federal parameters
shaping state and local action to ensure that state and local governments
are meeting their respective responsibilities to contribute to nationwide
decarbonization.
Recommendation 6: Within these federal parameters, states should retain a
significant role in planning and developing regulatory requirements in the
areas of electricity, building standards, transportation, and adaptation
actions.
Recommendation 7: Legislation addressing the climate crisis should not
immunize the fossil fuel industry from accountability in state tort law.
Instead, it should explicitly preserve state common-law suits seeking redress
for climate/COVID harms to ensure that state law continues to serve its
traditional and vital role of protecting the environment and public health.

Background
Structural deficiencies may occur if policymakers fail to appreciate the full
array of choices they have in allocating authority both between and within
levels of government. 117
First, federalism issues relate to one dimension of decision-making authority
– how centralized or decentralized the authority to regulate is. But, although
deciding how to allocate authority along that dimension is important, as the
federalism aspects of environmental regulation demonstrate, the
centralization-decentralization dimension is only one of three dimensions
along which authority may be allocated. Allocations of authority also can be
arrayed on a spectrum from overlapping to distinct, and from highly
coordinated to independent.
Positioning authority at a particular point along each dimension allows
policymakers to promote important policy values.
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•

Decentralized authority, for example, has the capacity to leverage local
knowledge and expertise, tailor regulation to local conditions, and foster
regulatory experimentation. Centralized authority, on the other hand,
may take advantage of economies of scale, foster uniformity, and
address collective action problems, like competitive fears or the “freerider” problem, more effectively.
• Overlapping authority can reduce risks of under-regulation and agency
capture, but distinct authority may minimize compliance or
administrative costs, as well as limit risks of conflicting regulation or
overregulation.
• Coordinated authority has the capacity to reduce duplicative
inefficiencies and inconsistencies and to promote accountability by
combating drift, shirking, and free riding by regulators. Independent
authority, in contrast, can avoid transaction costs of
coordination, combat groupthink that can squelch
Policymakers often do not
innovation, and foster beneficial competition among
consider the benefits of
multiple regulators.
differentiating regulatory
Because the poles of each dimension promote different
authority based on the different
and potentially conflicting values, policymakers have to
government functions that
prioritize the goals of their regulatory programs in order
regulation entails, such as funding,
to make appropriate structural choices. A decentralized
research, information distribution,
configuration that aims to promote experimentation, for
information analysis, planning,
instance, may require sacrificing transaction cost
standard setting, implementation,
efficiency that a centralized regime is capable of
permitting, inspection and
achieving. Situating authority along one dimension,
compliance monitoring, and
however, may help offset disadvantages that result from
enforce.
situating authority along a different one. For example,
coordination can be a useful means of avoiding the risk of
inaction by regulators with overlapping authority. To best
promote statutory objectives, policymakers should consider holistically the
interactions among all three dimensions.
Second, policymakers often do not consider the benefits of differentiating
regulatory authority based on the different government functions that
regulation entails, such as funding, research, information distribution,
information analysis, planning, standard setting, implementation,
permitting, inspection and compliance monitoring, and enforcement. An
allocation of authority that makes sense for the financing of a regulatory
program, for example, may be ill-suited to functions such as permitting or
enforcement. Differentiating allocations along one or more dimension
according to function may the best way to accommodate the conflicting
values that may result from policymakers’ dimensional choices.
Policymakers routinely conflate these dimensions and fail to differentiate
among governmental functions, resulting in mismatches between the
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problems that allocations of authority were designed to address and the
solutions chosen to address them. The recommendations provided here
urge more careful consideration of the tradeoffs of allocating authority to
address climate change at different points along each of the three
dimensions. They also reflect the conclusion that allocations should differ
based on the function being exercised, rather than choosing a single
allocation for all functions within a single subject area.

Proposed Policy: Allocating Authority for Three Different
Aspects of Climate Change Regulation
By Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman

Background and Context
Although allocation decisions inevitably will be context specific, climate
change adaptation, mitigation, and geoengineering implicate disparate
tradeoffs that generally suggest different structural configurations.

Adaptation
Strategies for managing the effects of climate tend to be deployed locally
and often involve particularly acute local benefits and harms.
•

•

•

In light of the diversity of and uncertainty accompanying most localized
climate effects, a primarily decentralized infrastructure would likely be
appropriate for most governmental functions, with limited centralization
of certain functions such as funding and information dissemination for
which economies of scale, uniformity, and/or transboundary cost
internalization are especially salient.
Limited overlapping authority (with federal primacy) of key functions
such as standard setting may best exploit redundancy while minimizing
inefficiencies.
Certain types of inter-jurisdictional coordination will help manage crossjurisdictional effects.

Mitigation
Strategies to limit greenhouse gas emissions provide environmental
benefits that may be either global or local in scale, but the economic harms
caused by such regulation tend to be localized. Accordingly:
•

The need for a national contribution to the global effort to curtail
emissions, as well as the risk of state inaction due to collective action
problems, suggests a robust role for centralized standard setting. Federal
standard-setting should, however, be supplemented by state authority
to promote experimentation and diversity.
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•

•

•

•

Overlapping state and federal authority for various functions is
appropriate to accrue safety net advantages and reduce capture risks,
especially absent a binding baseline international regime.
Relatively independent authority for functions such as standard setting,
permitting, and enforcement could foster a “race to the top” among
regulators and combat agency groupthink.
Coordination mechanisms for functions such as research funding and
information dissemination could promote economies of scale and
eliminate wasteful duplication of effort.
Coordinated implementation of cross-jurisdiction cap-and-trade regimes
could generate cost-efficient emission reductions.

Geoengineering
It is possible that even a single actor might deploy large-scale strategies to
alter the global climate, spurred by the promise of local environmental
and/or economic benefits. That action could, however, pose global
environmental risks.
•

•

Risks of unilateral deployment of untried, irreversible, and catastrophic
technologies suggests:
 Centralized control of research and deployment to minimize crossjurisdiction harms
 Leveraging the redundancy benefits of overlapping authority, and
 International coordination to minimize deployment by solitary
institutions.
On the other hand, independent, decentralized governance of research
and analysis of possible technologies may better promote diverse
research on risks and opportunities.

Recommendations
In structuring governance over climate change mitigation, adaptation, and
geoengineering activities:
•
•
•

•

Congress should consider the tradeoffs of assigning authority to either
states or the federal government.
It should consider varying the level of centralization by governmental
function.
It should explore configurations that assign overlapping federal and
state roles for particular government functions, as well as overlapping
roles for various federal agencies.
It should alter the amount and type of coordination between federal and
state authorities (and among federal agencies).
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Proposed Policy: A Better Approach to Factoring
Federalism Considerations into Regulatory Strategies
By Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman
Controversies over the appropriate allocations of policymaking authority
between the federal and state governments are almost as old as the
Republic, as the Supreme Court pointed out in a 1992 decision involving the
distribution of authority over radioactive waste disposal. 118 Yet, the disputes
never seem fully resolved. Certainly that is true of environmental regulation.
The federal pollution control statutes exemplify the neglected potential for
well-informed structural choices. Congress built the core environmental
statutes on a foundation of cooperative federalism. It established the
overarching policies, such as the Clean Air Act’s goals of improving and
protecting the nation’s air quality to avoid public health risks. But Congress
shared the responsibility of implementing those policies
between the states and the federal government, acting
Neither policymakers nor scholars
primarily through the U.S. Environmental Protection
seem to appreciate that
Agency (EPA).
cooperative federalism also
implicates key tradeoffs associated
The cooperative federalism model has worked
with the other two dimensions of
reasonably well, resulting in enhanced public health and
authority.
natural resource protection. It is a relatively rare instance
of Congress intentionally varying the allocation of
authority along one of the three dimensions – the extent of centralization of
authority – by regulatory function or task. In some cases, Congress created
centralized authority by charging one entity with the sole responsibility for
carrying out a particular function or task, such as EPA’s exclusive authority to
adopt national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. In
other cases, the Act creates decentralized authority through shared
regulatory authority between the two sovereigns, such as by preserving
state authority to adopt more stringent emission control standards for
stationary sources than EPA has enacted. Such cooperative federalism can
help leverage advantages of centralized federal governance (such as
expertise and superior ability to address cross-jurisdictional externalities), as
well as those of state governance (such as local knowledge).
However, as detailed below, neither policymakers nor scholars seem to
appreciate that cooperative federalism also implicates key tradeoffs
associated with the other two dimensions of authority.

The Overlapping-Distinct Dimension
As stated on page 2 above, situating authority at different points along the
overlap-distinctness dimension for each regulatory function results in
different tradeoffs of the values that regulation is designed to serve. The
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failure to appreciate the consequences of alternative structural options
often leads to missed opportunities to promote regulatory goals more
effectively, efficiently, or equitably. The Trump administration, for instance,
has heavily focused on reducing overlapping authority because of perceived
administrative waste. To be sure, having two regulators do the same thing
may raise administrative costs. But one should not reflexively assume that
having two authorities involved in a program necessarily means duplication
of tasks. Assigning one government control over one function and another
government authority over a completely different one leads to little
duplication of activity.
Even in cases where more than one authority has the same role, observers
routinely fail to account for the significant advantages of overlapping
authority. This includes, for example, the safety net provided in case one
level of government is unable or unwilling to act. Many observers simply
ignore these advantages, but they have proven to be key to the success of
cooperative federalism laws.

The Coordinated-Independent Dimension
Similarly, many policymakers have failed to appreciate that, designed
properly, the extent and type of coordination between the federal and state
governments can help mitigate any costs raised by overlap. Congress can
combine limited state and federal overlap with clear coordination
mechanisms between these governments. In so doing, it can achieve many
of the safety net advantages of overlapping authority while minimizing the
costs of duplication.
As is true for the other dimensions, creating coordinated or independent
authority presents a different mix of advantages and disadvantages.
Legislators and other structuring regulatory programs should consider these
tradeoffs in designing governance regimes, including establishing a
different mix of coordination and independence for different regulatory
functions. Finally, even if the tradeoffs favor coordination, policymakers
should recognize that it is possible to vary the extent of coordination (as well
as tradeoffs of doing so).

Recommendations
The experience in U.S. environmental law over the past 50 years suggests
that in adopting climate legislation:
•

Congress should establish federal primacy over governmental functions
(like financing, information dissemination, and standard setting) for
which economies of scale, uniformity, or the need to abate
interjurisdictional harms are important. At the same time, it should vest
the states with primacy over other functions (like planning,
implementation and enforcement) that would benefit from local
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•

•

expertise, diversity of approach and experimentation, and greater public
accessibility. This combination would help leverage the advantages of
centralized and decentralized authority.
Overlapping authority is a good fit for functions that risk underregulation or regulatory capture, such as standard-setting or
enforcement. This approach is reflected in the provisions in virtually all of
the federal pollution control laws that preserve state authority to adopt
regulatory standards (and impose common law remedies) that are more
stringent than federal standards, and in the retention of federal authority
to enforce state-imposed obligations under some of these laws. More
distinct authority for functions, such as information generation and
information dissemination, is useful in achieving economies of scale,
avoiding wasteful duplication and lowering the risk of inaction and lack
of accountability stemming from the regulatory commons that shared
authority may create.
Congress should rely on different types of intergovernmental
coordination (such as coordination that is more or less frequent,
hierarchical, or formal) when it seeks to pool regulator expertise, avoid
inefficient duplication of effort, harmonize regulation, or reduce the risk
of a regulatory race to the bottom. Independent authority, however, may
be a good choice for functions, such as information analysis, standard
setting, and enforcement, to minimize administrative costs, promote
intergovernmental competition, or avoid the risk of regulator
groupthink.

Proposed Policy: Overlapping Authority to Limit
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles
By Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman

Background and Context
For five decades, California and the federal government have worked in
tandem in an innovative exercise in federalism aimed at achieving cleaner
air. California has played an important role in controlling greenhouse gas
emissions (GHGs) that contribute to climate change, particularly from motor
vehicles. But now, contrary to law and in a massive departure from
longstanding practice, Donald Trump has pulled the rug out from under
California’s feet by divesting it of its longstanding authority to adopt auto
emission controls for greenhouse gases that are more stringent than the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s. 119 That action, if not overturned in
pending judicial challenges, will neuter California’s innovative leadership by
disabling an important tool for combatting climate change.
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Because of the severity of California’s pollution problems and the state’s
early environmental leadership, the Clean Air Act specifically allows the state
to apply for a waiver of the prohibition on state auto emission standards
more stringent than the federal government’s. California has sought waivers
more than a hundred times, and with one short-lived exception, EPA has
granted every request – precisely as the law anticipated.
Once EPA grants a waiver, any other state may follow
Contrary to law and in a massive
California’s ambitious lead by adopting its standards.
departure from longstanding
Essentially, then, the Clean Air Act provides all states
practice, Donald Trump has pulled
with two options: the federal standard or the more
the rug out from under
stringent California option.
California’s feet by divesting it of
its longstanding authority to
The result is that more than a dozen states follow
adopt auto emission controls for
California’s more stringent standards, which is why
greenhouse gases that are more
many cars sold outside the state bear a sticker that says
stringent than the U.S.
the car has met California’s standards. The auto industry
Environmental Protection
has long since adjusted to these dual standards, not
Agency’s.
wanting to ignore such a huge market for its products.
But the Trump administration deviated sharply from
established bipartisan practice by revoking previously approved waivers for
California, purportedly to achieve nationally uniform emission controls and
eliminate “duplicative” regulation. The second part of its devastating onetwo punch was to weaken federal standards adopted during the Obama
administration that had required fuel efficiency improvements that would
reduce GHG auto emissions. 120
To be sure, centralization may promote uniformity, and reducing
overlapping authority may modestly decrease some administrative costs.
However, in addition to being of questionable legality, 121 EPA’s revocation
completely ignored the most important advantages of the prior system, as
well as the significant downsides of revoking the waiver. These include:
•

•

•

The allocation of standard-setting authority to California embodies a
productive balancing of the different dimensions of regulatory authority:
from centralized to decentralized, overlapping to distinct, and
coordinated to independent.
The Clean Air Act’s bifurcated standard-setting authority for auto
emissions fosters the experimentation advantages of decentralization.
But by allowing only two sets of standards – EPA’s and California’s – it
also tempers the risk of many conflicting standards and overregulation.
Similarly, by requiring that EPA approve California’s waiver requests, the
law requires some coordination, fostering pooling of expertise and
resources. But it also cultivates innovation by ensuring each regulator’s
independence. That allocation has allowed California to engage in
innovative regulation. In fact, several large automakers recently agreed
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•

to conform to the state’s ambitious GHG controls, notwithstanding EPA’s
effort to eliminate them. 122
Finally, the waiver repeal ignores how the law’s modest overlap in
authority creates a safety net and guards against undue industry control
of regulatory agencies that is all too apparent under the Trump
administration. Weighing these different tradeoffs is key to designing
effective governance, but EPA completely misses all of them.

California’s innovation and leadership should be fostered, not squelched.
Retaining the state’s authority to adopt more stringent GHG auto emission
standards is a critical vehicle for doing so. Congress should reverse
revocation of the existing GHG waiver, and along the way, lighten the state’s
burden of proving eligibility for future waivers, or even eliminate EPA’s veto
authority altogether.
Either approach would foster regulatory experimentation and provide a
check on inaction or inadequate regulation by EPA. Moreover, these
changes would not forfeit the significant benefits typically associated with
coordinated regulatory authority (such as EPA’s authority to review state
standards). Though coordination can reduce the risk that states will adopt
ever-weaker standards to attract business or otherwise fail to protect public
health, neither is a concern here. California has consistently adopted more
stringent controls than EPA.

Recommendation
•

EPA’s revocation promises to wreak havoc with the Clean Air Act’s careful
balancing of the tradeoffs associated with alternative regulatory
allocations. Congress should restore California’s emission control
authority – by reversing EPA’s revocation of California’s waiver authority,
lightening California’s burden of justifying future waivers, or both. Doing
so would avoid needlessly sacrificing the advantages of decentralized,
overlapping, and independent regulatory authority, and preserve a
powerful weapon in the fight against climate change and deadly air
pollution.

Proposed Policy: States' Role in Federal Climate Legislation
By Alice Kaswan, William W. Buzbee, and Dave Owen

Background and Context
Decisive federal climate action is essential. At the same time, however,
federal climate legislation would not be built from a blank slate. Many states
already have greenhouse gas reduction targets, action plans to meet those
targets, related clean air programs, and substantial roles in the electricity
sector. Congress should embrace an effective, strong federal role while
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affirmatively creating an integrated federal/state partnership, as well as
preserving and protecting additional state and local efforts, thereby gaining
the benefits of both centralized and decentralized authority.
The Value of Creating Affirmative State Roles within a Federal Structure
A strong state role within federal law is not unusual. Many federal
environmental laws embody a “cooperative federalism” approach that
carefully structures federal, state, and local roles to create a cohesive whole
that draws on the strengths of each jurisdictional level. This approach
creates several key advantages.
First, federal-state collaborations can lead to better-informed climate change
responses. States could build on existing state climate action plans and learn
from each other’s efforts. A strong state role in these areas is justified by the
states’ expertise in their diverse geographic, economic, and social history
and needs, and their historic diversity of efforts. And states may identify
areas of effective regulation overlooked by federal
legislation and regulation.
Federal-state collaborations can
make climate responses more
Second, states can tailor their federal law implementation
politically feasible and durable.
efforts to their unique circumstances and goals. For
States are more likely to support
example, allowing state planning will enable states to
federal legislation if it includes
develop integrated plans that achieve state-specific
some degree of state control.
objectives, like enhancing public health by integrating
Preserving state and local roles
GHG and co-pollutant emission reduction strategies,
will also enable greater bottomcreating economic opportunities, and facilitating just
up participation in conceiving
transitions for communities and workers impacted by the
our clean energy transition.
demise of fossil fuels and other shifts in the nation’s
economy.
Third, federal-state collaborations can make climate responses more
politically feasible and durable. States are more likely to support federal
legislation if it includes some degree of state control. Preserving state and
local roles will also enable greater bottom-up participation in conceiving our
clean energy transition.
The Importance of Preserving Existing State Authority
Most federal environmental laws preserve existing state authority through
“savings” clauses that allow states to choose to do more than required by
federal regulation. As the federal government assumes a more prominent
legal role in addressing climate change, Congress should, similarly, preserve
state authority. Outright preemption of state roles should be the exception,
not the norm. Federal environmental laws have almost uniformly included
savings clauses, which allow overlapping state authority, because of the risk
of federal regulatory ineffectiveness and backpedaling. Preserving state
authority to do more has been crucial to maintaining national progress in
meeting climate and other regulatory goals, and to test and establish
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effective additional strategies. If federal climate regulatory zeal, once
established, were to wane, or should federal measures turn out to be too lax
to achieve needed climate progress, savings clauses preserving state
authority would allow states to make up for the federal lapse.

Recommendations
•

•

•

•

Establish a strong federal role where appropriate, including establishing
national greenhouse gas reduction goals, establishing a national carbon
pricing system and facilitating linkages among state, federal, and
international markets, developing mobile source emission requirements,
and investing in research and development.
Provide strong federal parameters to shape state and local action to
ensure that state and local governments are meeting their respective
responsibilities to contribute to nationwide decarbonization goals.
Establish and fund federal programs to facilitate state and regional
climate action. Through ongoing collaboration between the federal
government’s national and regional offices, and state (and sometimes
local) regulators, the federal government should:
 Continue research on climate change impacts and disseminate it to
state and local governments;
 Create clearinghouses for information about effective state, federal,
and global strategies and practices to mitigate and adapt to climate
change and provide technical support to help states and local
governments implement them;
 Create incentives for state and local cooperative climate regulation
efforts; and
 Provide financial resources to state and local governments for
planning and implementation of mitigation and adaptation
measures.
Within these federal parameters, allow states to play a significant and
sometimes leadership role in planning and developing requirements in
the following contexts:
 Electricity: States have historically controlled electricity generation
sources, land use decisionmaking and siting choices, and the majority
of states have established renewable portfolio standards and energy
efficiency standards. Potentially under an overarching federal
Renewable Energy Standard, states, alone or in combination with
states sharing the same electricity grid, could determine the mix of
sources and efficiency measures most suitable for the state or region.
In addition to determining sources, states could address the relative
centralization or decentralization of sources and control, as well as
realigning state utility regulatory policies to reflect the changing
nature of the electricity sector. Careful coordination with authority
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•

•

exercised by the federal Department of Energy and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission will be necessary.
 Buildings: Although the federal government should require all states
to adopt building efficiency codes, states could tailor their approach
to local weather conditions and their mix of new versus existing
housing, and accommodate other local and regional concerns,
including social welfare and historic preservation goals.
 Transportation: Because land use patterns affect transportation
emissions, state and local governments should be tasked with
developing planning and zoning parameters and, as appropriate,
developing transit systems or other measures and incentives to
reduce vehicle miles travelled. As discussed more fully in the section
on California’s automobile standards, federal climate law should
reinstate California’s ability to establish a second option for GHG
emission standards.
 Adaptation: Given the highly localized nature of some climate
impacts, states are well positioned to develop tailored adaptation
plans, with federal planning and implementation support. In
addition, any state and local use of federal spending on projects
involving infrastructure and building should be required to include
climate adaption assessment and prudent adjustment of plans.
Through savings clauses, federal climate legislation should explicitly
preserve state and local government authority so they can impose
additional state and local pollution reduction measures and pursue
additional clean energy goals, whether to reduce GHG emissions; to
meet other state and local environmental, safety, welfare, and health
goals; or to achieve these goals through multi-pollutant reduction
strategies.
Federal climate legislation should set regulatory floors that do not let
states set standards lower than federal requirements, but should, in most
instances, not preempt complementary state and local climate, clean
energy, pollution control, and land use authority. Where legislation does
include a preemption provision (like the partial preemption of mobile
source standards), the preemption provision should make clear that
preemption will be found only upon a fact-based, adjudicated
determination of an actual, substantial conflict between such state and
local efforts and federal requirements. Any federal preemption
provisions should explicitly state that state and local government
choices that merely seek additional reductions in emissions or embrace
cleaner energy requirements or goals than federally required are not
preempted unless such measures are proven to be directly in conflict
and compliance with both is impossible.

Climate, Energy, Justice

82

Conclusion
Federal leadership, control, and resources are warranted to address the
emerging climate crisis. Nonetheless, federal climate legislation should craft
a careful partnership with state and local entities. Such a federalism balance
would set necessary goals and encourage cooperative state and local efforts
while also preserving space for additional state and local regulatory efforts.
Through such a climate federalism balance, the nation is likely to achieve a
more effective transition that meshes with a diversity of state concerns and
needs, increasing the benefits and decreasing the costs of a clean energy
transition.

Proposed Policy: The Role of State Tort Law in Climate
Protections
By Karen Sokol

Background and Context
Since the summer of 2017, numerous states, cities, counties, and one fishing
industry association have filed tort suits in state courts against ExxonMobil,
Chevron, BP, Shell, and other major fossil fuel companies, in an effort to hold
them accountable for contributing to the climate crisis and then misleading
the public about it. 123 The plaintiffs seek compensation for myriad regionspecific climate harms – including current and future damages to
infrastructure, land and other natural resources, and the public’s health,
property, and livelihoods – caused by sea-level rise, drought, wildfires, ocean
acidification, storms of record-breaking severity, and other climate-driven
environmental disruptions. The most recent case as of this writing, filed by
Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison in June 2020, highlights the
disproportionate impacts of the climate crisis on Black, Indigenous, and
brown communities. 124
In their public relations messaging, the industry and its trade associations
condemn the suits and call for legislation providing them with immunity.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has called for such legislation at the state
level, 125 and the National Association of Manufacturers created an advocacy
arm with the sole mission of attacking the state suits that will likely do so as
well. 126 Given that several suits are poised to begin discovery proceedings in
state courts, a process that could lead to further revelations of corporate
deception and other malfeasance, the industry can be expected to push for
immunity at the federal level as well. Indeed, the industry has already
pushed for sweeping immunity in the COVID-19 relief packages that
Congress has been considering. 127 In light of this, the industry will almost
certainly call for such immunity in any federal climate legislation. Federal

Climate, Energy, Justice

83

and state legislators should resist such efforts as they craft vital climate
legislation.
It is beyond question that, like COVID-19 relief legislation, climate legislation
is urgently needed. But, as summarized below, by its very nature, legislation
– no matter how robust its protections and how well-crafted its provisions –
will never obviate the need for state tort law to serve the unique,
complementary role in forging corporate accountability and environmental
and public health protections that it has long served in the U.S. legal system.
State tort law has always been an important legal mechanism in this country
for holding private actors responsible for unreasonable misconduct and for
providing compensation to those harmed by that misconduct. It became
particularly important in the mid-20th century, as corporate actors amassed
greater economic and political power while also gaining significant control
over public perceptions as a result of their sophisticated – and often
deceptive – marketing campaigns. In the 1960s, in response to widespread
harms caused by businesses’ reliance on misleading marketing strategies to
unsafe products, state courts began drawing on existing state tort law
principles to provide relief to the injured, as well as accountability to the
public at large. That function was and remains all the more important
because corporate influence had by then begun to wield significant
influence over the regulatory system, leaving public protections inadequate
in important ways. Thus, state courts served as a legal venue for those
seeking redress for harms caused by the wrongdoing of various industries,
including the tobacco, gun, chemical, food production, and fossil fuel
industries. In addition to providing much-needed compensation to the
injured, these tort suits have induced industries to operate more safely,
avoiding future harms.
The current wave of climate suits that states, cities, and counties all over the
country have filed against fossil fuel industry defendants may prove to be
the most important mass tort suits yet. Even before discovery, the plaintiffs
have extensive documentation that the defendants have (1) known for
decades that they were contributing to the climate crisis and its devastating
consequences, and (2) responded to that knowledge with a concerted
disinformation campaign about the climate crisis and its connection to
fossil-fuel product use and an acceleration of their business to further
entrench societal dependence on fossil fuels. This is the sort of corporate
malfeasance that state tort law has been addressing for decades.
Such state venues are particularly essential now, when the Trump
administration is systematically suppressing climate science and its
implications across agencies, including the EPA, the Department of the
Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and the State Department. The
administration’s systematic suppression of climate science is part of the way
it supports its efforts to dismantle the climate protections that were in place
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and to justify its refusal to provide the much more extensive protections that
are necessary 128 while accelerating approval and construction of pipelines
and increasing drilling on federal lands and offshore. 129
Ensuring that these state claims are preserved in federal climate legislation
will greatly strengthen the national response to the climate crisis and
complement legislative action to reduce emissions and adapt to the climate
crisis. More specifically, the ability to bring a state tort action will remain
essential even after climate legislation is adopted for at least three reasons:
•

•

•

Federal regulation of greenhouse gases is unlikely to compensate
current and future victims of the climate crisis, and state tort law can
provide some measure of relief;
The civil discovery process can provide essential information on both the
climate crisis and the fossil fuel industry’s longstanding attempts to hold
onto their profits in ways that intensified climate disruption; and
In the event that federal targets end up weak or if, as is currently the
case, implementation ceases or falters, state tort law can provide a vital
safety net.

Recommendations
•

•

Legislation addressing the climate or any other crisis should not include
provisions immunizing the fossil fuel industry from accountability in
state tort law.
As climate harms multiply, legislation should instead explicitly preserve
state common-law suits seeking redress for climate or COVID harms to
ensure that state law is allowed to continue to serve its traditional and
vital role protecting the environment and public health. Instead, such
legislation should include language explicitly preserving lawsuits.

Climate, Energy, Justice

85

About the Center for Progressive Reform
Founded in 2002, the nonprofit Center for Progressive Reform connects a
nationwide network of scholars with policymakers and allied public interest
advocates. CPR pursues a vision of legal and regulatory policies that put health,
safety, and environmental protection before private interests and corporate
profit. With rigorous analysis, strategic engagement in public interest
campaigns, and a commitment to social welfare, CPR supports thoughtful
government action, ready public access to the courts, enhanced public
participation, and freer access to information.

About the Authors
Shalanda H. Baker is a Professor of Law, Public Policy and
Urban Affairs at the Northeastern University School of Law in
Boston, Massachusetts, and the Co-Founder and Co-Director
of the Initiative for Energy Justice.

William W. Buzbee is a Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center.

Alejandro Camacho is Chancellor's Professor of Law at the
University of California, Irvine, and Faculty Director, UCI
Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources. He has
a joint appointment in Law and Political Science.

Daniel A. Farber is the Sho Sato Professor of Law
and Director of the California Center for Law, Energy and the
Environment at the University of California, Berkeley School
of Law.

Robert L. Fischman is George P. Smith, II Distinguished
Professor of Law; Professor of Public and Environmental
Affairs (adjunct) at Indiana University Maurer School of Law in
Bloomington.

Climate, Energy, Justice

86

Victor B. Flatt is the Dwight Olds Chair and Faculty Director
of the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Center,
University of Houston Law Center, and a Distinguished
Scholar, Global Energy Management Institute at the
University of Houston.

Robert L. Glicksman is the J. B. and Maurice C. Shapiro
Professor of Environmental Law at the George Washington
University Law School. He is a member of the board of
directors of the Center for Progressive Reform.

Alice Kaswan is a Professor at the University of San Francisco
School of Law, and a member of the board of directors of the
Center for Progressive Reform.

Alexandra Klass is a Distinguished McKnight University
Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School.

Christine A. Klein is the Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Hazouri &
Roth Professor, University Term Professor, and Director, LL.M.
Program in Environmental & Land Use Law at the University
of Florida, Levin College of Law, Gainesville.

Sarah Krakoff is the Moses Lasky Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado, Boulder.

Joel A. Mintz is a Professor Emeritus of Law and C. William
Trout Senior Fellow in Public Interest Law at Nova
Southeastern University Law Center in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.

Climate, Energy, Justice

87

Uma Outka is a Professor of Law at the University of Kansas
School of Law.

Dave Owen is a Professor of Law at the University of
California Hastings College of the Law.

Daniel J. Rohlf is a Professor of Law and Of Counsel, Earthrise
Law Center at the Lewis & Clark Law School.

Karen Sokol is Associate Professor of Law at the Loyola
University College of Law in New Orleans.

Joseph P. Tomain is Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen
Ziegler Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati
College of Law.

Hannah Wiseman is a Professor of Law and a Professor and
Wilson Faculty Fellow in the College of Earth and Mineral
Sciences, and Institutes of Energy and the Environment Cofunded Faculty Member at Penn State University.

Sandra Zellmer is a Professor of Law and Director of Natural
Resources Clinics at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at
the University of Montana.

Climate, Energy, Justice

88

Connect with CPR
Website:

https://progressivereform.org

CPRBlog:

https://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/

Twitter:

@CPRBlog

Facebook:

http://on.fb.me/1Tqj0nJ

Direct media inquiries by email to Brian Gumm at
bgumm@progressivereform.org or Matthew Freeman at
mfreeman@progressivereform.org, or by phone at 202.747.0698.
A web-friendly version of this report is available on our website, at
https://progressivereform.org/our-work/energy-environment/climate-energyjustice/.

Acknowledgments
CPR is grateful to the Public Welfare Foundation, the Bauman Foundation, and
the Deer Creek Foundation for their generous support of CPR's work.

Climate, Energy, Justice

89

Endnotes
Demand response is the practice of paying electricity users to cut back on their electricity
use at times of peak demand, which lowers wholesale energy prices for everyone and
reduces the need to build excess electricity generation capacity. See, e.g., FERC v. Electric
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760. (2016) (upholding Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission rule promoting and regulating demand response).

1

Electricity in the United States is Produced with Diverse Energy Sources and Technologies, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-theus.php (explaining that the largest sources of U.S. electricity generation in 2018 were
natural gas at 35 percent and coal at 27 percent); Energy Use for Transportation, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/use-of-energy/transportation.php (“In
2018, petroleum products accounted for about 92 percent of the total U.S. transportation
sector energy use. . . . Natural gas accounted for about 3 percent.”).
2

NC Clean Energy Tech. Ctr./DSIRE, Renewable & Clean Energy Standards (June 2019),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/RPS-CESJune2019.pdf; Alexandra B. Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 49
(2020) (discussing state clean energy statutes enacted in 2012 and 2020).
3

Energy Info. Admin, U.S. Renewable Energy Consumption Surpasses Coal for the First Time in
Over 130 Years (May 28, 2020), at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895.

4

5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C vi
(2019), available at:
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_Low_Res.pdf

Energy Info. Admin., Global Electricity Consumption Continues to Rise Faster than Population
(2000-2017) (June 15, 2020), at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44095.

6

The United States is a Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, which, as implemented under the Paris Agreement, requires Parties to make
Nationally Determined Contributions to climate mitigation through domestic policies with
“highest possible ambition”, consistent with “common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.” Paris
Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, available at:
https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_ag
reement.pdf (last visited June. 2020). In November 2019, the Trump Administration notified
the UN Secretary-General of the intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris
Agreement, but the withdrawal is not effective until November 2020.
7

These proposals have been advanced for many years—dozens already tried and failed by
2010, see, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1339, 1364-65 (2010), with new proposals as recent as last year when Senator Tim Kaine
proposed the Clean Energy Act of 2019 (116th Cong. 1st Sess.),
https://smithsenate.app.box.com/s/pnq9j3rmxdxlk7nigu58710b8xrlcmk5.
8

Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, Policy Implications of Deep Decarbonization in
the United States 8 (US 2050 Vol. 2 Policy Report) (2015), at:
http://deepdecarbonization.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Policy_Report.pdf.
9

10 Goldman School of Public Policy, Univ. of Ca. Berkeley, The 2035 Report: Plummeting Solar,
Wind, and Battery Costs Can Accelerate Our Clean Energy Future (June 2020), available at:
https://www.2035report.com See Sonia Aggarwal & Mike O’Boyle, Policy Summary for
Congress (June 2020) (recommending for “55 percent by 2025, 75 percent by 2030, 90
percent by 2035, and 100 percent by 2045”), at: https://www.2035report.com/downloads/.

For example, in the Southwest Power Pool, the regional transmission organization with a
footprint extending from the northern plains states and Canadian border to Oklahoma, was

11

Climate, Energy, Justice

90

able to set a new record of 72 percent of hourly electricity demand served by wind
generation in April 2020 thanks to its ability to dispatch on a regional basis. Energy Info.
Admin, The Central United States Set Several Wind Power Records this Spring (June 12, 2020).
SPP met 29 percent of electricity demand with wind in 2019. Id.
12 NAACP, Environmental and Climate Justice Program Goals, at:
https://www.naacp.org/environmental-climate-justice-about/.
13 Many thanks to Professor Dan Walters of Penn State Law—University Park for comments
on this section. All errors and opinions in this section are mine.

FERC Order E-1, Dec. 19, 2019, https://cms.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/whats-new/commmeet/2019/121919/E-1.pdf.
14

15

Id. at 10.

16 Exelon in Illinois has threatened to stop operating its two nuclear plants in the state if it
does not receive further subsidization from the state, in part because its plants likely will not
be able to “compete in PJM’s capacity market” under the MOPR, and Illinois has not adopted
the Fixed Resource Requirement approach that Exelon would prefer. Jeff St. John, Exelon
Threatens to Close 2 Nuclear Plants as Battle Over State Subsidies Looms, Green Tech Media,
Aug. 28, 2020, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/exelon-threatens-to-closetwo-nuclear-plants-as-battle-over-state-subsidies-looms.
17

FERC Order E-1, supra note 14, at 11.

162 FERC ¶ 61,205, Mar. 9, 2019, https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180309230225ER18-619-000.pdf. ISO New England’s approach appears superior to PJM’s problematic
MOPR, however. For example, ISO New England has a MOPR alternative auction through
which subsidized and non-subsidized generation resources can essentially trade capacity
obligations. David Boyd, States have Options in the New MOPR World, UtilityDive , Aug. 21,
2020, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/states-have-options-in-the-new-moprworld/583187/.
18

19 Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market
Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, YALE J. ON REG. BULL., Nov. 8, 2019,
https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/the-quiet-undoing-how-regional-electricity-marketreforms-threaten-state-clean-energy-goals/.

FERC Order E-1, Glick, Commissioner, dissenting, https://www.ferc.gov/media/statementsspeeches/glick/2020/04-16-20-glick-E-4.pdf.

20

21 Robert Walton, New Jersey Looks to Exit PJM Capacity Market, Worried MOPR Will Impede
100% Carbon Free Goals, UtilityDive, Mar. 31, 2020, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/newjersey-looks-to-exit-pjm-capacity-market-worried-the-mopr-will-impede/575160/
(describing New Jersey’s consideration of the Fixed Resource Requirement, among other
potential options).
22 The Independent Market Monitor for PJM, Potential Impacts of the Creation of New Jersey
FRRs (May 13, 2020),
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2020/IMM_Potential_Impacts_of_the
_Creation_of_New_Jersey_FRRS_20200513.pdf.
23 Heather Richards & Arianna Skibell, FERC Order Could Bar Offshore Wind from U.S. Power
Market, E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (May 13, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063120381.

See, e.g., Catherine Morehouse, Broad Array of Groups Sue FERC Over PJM MOPR Decision as
Chatterjee Rejects Cost, Renewable Concerns, UtilityDive, Apr. 27, 2020,
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/broad-array-of-groups-sue-ferc-over-pjm-mopr-decisionas-chatterjee-rejects/576478/.
24

25 Compliance Filing Concerning the Minimum Offer Price Rule, Request for Waiver of RPM
Auction Deadlines, and Request for an Extended Comment Period of at Least 35 Days (Mar.
18, 2020), https://pjm.com/directory/etariff/FercDockets/4443/20200318-er18-1314003.pdf; Catherine Morehouse, PJM MOPR Compliance Plan Allays Renewable Sector Concerns

Climate, Energy, Justice

91

of Being Shut Out of Capacity Auctions, UtilityDive, Mar. 19, 2020,
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-files-mopr-compliance-plan-with-ferc-allayingrenewable-sector-concern/574448/ (describing the order).
See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009); California Wilderness
Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011).

26

27 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624 (2012).
28 See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (final rule preempting California authority to
control vehicular greenhouse gas emissions and revoking waiver for California’s
greenhouse gas standards and zero-emission vehicle program); The Safer Affordable FuelEfficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Vehicles,
Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 24174 (2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-0430/pdf/2020-06967.pdf (final rule rolling back vehicular greenhouse gas emission
standards).
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Sinks 1990-2018 ES-7, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/usghg-inventory-2020-main-text.pdf.
30 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other
Conveyances, https://www.bts.gov/content/number-us-aircraft-vehicles-vessels-and-otherconveyances.

AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, American Driving Survey, 2014-2017 (Feb. 2019),
https://aaafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/18-0783_AAAFTS-ADSBrief_r8.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. VehicleMiles, https://www.bts.gov/content/us-vehicle-miles.
31

Fabio Caiazzo et al., Air Pollution and Early Deaths in the United States: Quantifying the
Impacts of Major Sectors in 2005. 79 Atmospheric Environment 198 (2013).
32

Andrew L. Goodkind et al., Fine-Scale Damage Estimates of Particulate Matter Air
Pollution Reveal Opportunities for Location-Specific Mitigation of Emissions, 18 Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. 8775 (2019).
33

William Pizer, The Economics of Improving Fuel Economy, Resources (Fall 2006),
https://www.resourcesmag.org/archives/the-economics-of-improving-fuel-economy/.
34

35 The European Association of Electrical Contractors, Powering a New Value Chain in the
Automotive Sector: The Job Potential of Transport Electrification 13,
https://download.dalicloud.com/fis/download/66a8abe211271fa0ec3e2b07/c572c686-f52f4c0d-88fc-51f9061126c5/Powering_a_new_value_chain_in_the_automotive_sector__the_job_potential_of_transport_electrification.pdf.

The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 required NHTSA to establish Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards beginning with vehicle model year 1978.
36

37 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (2010).
38 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624 (2012).
39 The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24174 (2020),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-04-30/pdf/2020-06967.pdf;
40 The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficiency (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program,
84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-09-27/pdf/201920672.pdf.

Climate, Energy, Justice

92

41 EPA Regulatory Announcement, EPA and NHTSA Set Standards to Reduce Greenhouse
Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Model Years 2017-2025 Cars and Light Trucks 8
(August 2012),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZ7C.PDF?Dockey=P100EZ7C.PDF.
42 Virginia McConnell et al., California’s Evolving Zero Emission Vehicle Program: Pulling New
Technology into the Market 3, 6 (Res. for the Future, Working Paper No. 19-22, 2019),
https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/californias-evolving-zero-emissionvehicle-program/.
43 H.R. 2764--Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019 (Introduced),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2764/text.
44 House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, Solving the Climate Crisis: The
Congressional Action Plan for a Clean Energy Economy and a Healthy, Resilient, and Just
America (2020), https://climatecrisis.house.gov/sites/climatecrisis.house.gov/files/Climate
percent20Crisis percent20Action percent20Plan.pdf.
45 One National Program on Federal Preemption of State Fuel Economy Standards, 84 Fed.
Reg. 51310 (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-09-27/pdf/201920672.pdf; https://www.ttnews.com/articles/gm-tesla-head-new-year-without-electricvehicle-tax-credits

H.R. 2256--Driving America Forward Act (introduced),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2256/text.
46

H.R. 2042--Electric CARS Act of 2019 (introduced), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/2042/text. See also Congressional Research Service, Electric Vehicles: A
Primer on Technology and Selected Policy Issues 18 (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46231.pdf (summarizing this bill and the other bills referenced
in this white paper).
47

48 Zefei Yang et al., Principles for Effective Electric Vehicle Incentive Design (June 2016),
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_IZEV-incentives-comp_201606.pdf.

Hieu Le and Andrew Linhardt, Rev Up: A Nationwide Study of the Electric Vehicle Shopping
Experience, Sierra Club, (October 5, 2020),
https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/program/documents/2153%20Re
v%20Up%20Report%202019_3_web.pdf
49

50 California Air Resources Board, Advanced Clean Trucks Fact Sheet (June 25, 2020),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/advanced-clean-trucks-fact-sheet.
51 Climate Leadership and Environmental Action for our Nation’s (CLEAN) Future Act,
Discussion Draft § 422 , Jan. 28, 2020,
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/doc
uments/0128 percent20CLEAN percent20Future percent20Discussion percent20Draft.pdf.

Federal Transit Administration, Fiscal Year 2020 Buses and Bus Facilities Projects,
https://www.transit.dot.gov/funding/grants/fiscal-year-2020-buses-and-bus-facilitiesprojects.
52

Green Bus Act of 2019, H.R. 2164 (proposed), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/2164#:~:text= percent2F09 percent2F2019)-,Green percent20Bus
percent20Act percent20of percent202019,beginning percent20on percent20October
percent201 percent2C percent202029.
53

54 Federal Transit Administration, Low or No Emission Program (Low-No Program) – FY 2020
Notice of Funding, https://www.transit.dot.gov/funding/applying/notices-funding/low-orno-emission-program-low-no-program-fy2020-notice-funding#:~:text=The percent20Low
percent2DNo percent20Program percent20provides,leasing percent20of
percent20required percent20supporting percent20facilities.
55 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act § 5339,
https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ94/PLAW-114publ94.pdf.

Climate, Energy, Justice

93

56 Environmental Protection Agency, School Bus Rebates: Diesel Emissions Reduction Act
(DERA), https://www.epa.gov/dera/rebates.
57

CLEAN Future Act, supra note 51, at § 423.

Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 §125 (2019).
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr1865/BILLS-116hr1865enr.pdf.
58

59

26 U.S.C. 30C.

Level 1 charging is 120 volts alternating current (AC), Level 2 charging is 240 volts AC, and
Level 3 charging is 500 volts direct current. Congressional Research Service, supra note 47,
at 12.
60

H.R. 2616--Clean Corridors Act of 2019 (introduced), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/2616/text.
61

62 Electric Vehicle (EV) Freedom Act, H.R. 5770 §§ 3, 5 (proposed),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5770/text.

America’s Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019, S. 2302 § 1401 (reported to Senate
Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s2302/BILLS-116s2302rs.pdf.

63

64

CLEAN Future Act, supra note 51, at xx.

65

CLEAN Future Act, supra note 51, at § 435.

Leading Infrastructure for Tomorrow’s America Act, H.R. 2741 (proposed 2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2741/text#tocHA275408FE695442EBEA1F4A11849E72F.
66

67 Ramon A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas
Infrastructure, 17 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 6435, 6436 (2012) (“Converting a fleet of gasoline cars
to CNG [compressed natural gas] increases radiative forcing for 80 yr before any net climate
benefits are achieved . . . .”).
68

Id.

Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr22/BILLS-114hr22enr.pdf (codified in 23 U.S. Code
§151).
69

Federal Highway Administration, Alternative Fuel Corridors,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/alternative_fuel_corridors/.
70

71

U.S. Dept. of Energy, Clean Cities Coalition Network, https://cleancities.energy.gov/.

72 See Congressional Research Service, Federal Public Transportation Program In Brief 4-5,
Feb. 4, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42706.pdf.
73

Select Committee, supra note __, at 106-07.

Id. at 108-09; see also 110-11 (recommending updating and reauthorizing funding for
programs to increase bicycle and pedestrian safety and to create new grant programs for
carbon-reducing projects like car-free zones).
74

World Health Organization, International Agency for Research on Cancer, DIESEL AND
GASOLINE ENGINE EXHAUSTS AND SOME NITROARENES (2012).
75

See, e.g., U.S. EPA, NATIONAL PORT STRATEGY ASSESSMENT: REDUCING AIR POLLUTION AND
GREENHOUSE GASES AT U.S. PORTS 4 (2016).
76

77

See California Air Resources Board, Advanced Clean Trucks Fact Sheet (June 25, 2020).

78

Select Committee Recommendations, supra note __, at 122.

79

See, e.g., Select Committee Recommendations, supra note __, at 124.

80

Id. at 119.

Climate, Energy, Justice

94

81 California Air Resources Board, California Climate Investments, Moving California: Car
Sharing & Clean Mobility Options Incentive Programs in Disadvantaged Communities,
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/msprog/lct/carsharing.htm (last visited July 17, 2020).
82

See id. at 109-10.

In 2016, 78 percent of electric vehicle tax credits were claimed by taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes over $100,000, who comprise about 17 percent of all taxpayers. Molly F.
Sherlock, Congressional Research Service, In Focus: The Plug-In Electric Vehicle Tax Credit (May
14, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11017.pdf.
83

84 The Select Committee’s climate policy recommendations outlined a series of bills that
have attempted to make incentives for new or used zero-emission vehicles more available
to low- and moderate-income households. See Select Committee Recommendations, supra
note __, at 91-92 and 97.

UNCCD Secretariat, Zero Net Land Degradation: A Sustainable Development Goal for Rio
+20 13 (2012.
85

See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 Minn. L.
Rev. 869, 933 (1997).
86

USFS, Status of Forest Service Land Management Plans,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd593201.pdf.
87

88 Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, "Not Supported by Current Science": The National
Forest Management Act and the Lessons of Environmental Monitoring for the Future of
Public Resources Management, 32 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 151, 168–69 (2013).
89 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks
(2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory2020-main-text.pdf.

See Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress, CRS
Report R45705 (April 25, 2019) (providing an overview of BRAC criteria and processes).

90

See, e.g., Kevin Ridder, A Just Transition for Coal Communities, The Appalachian Voice,
Feb. 25, 2020, https://appvoices.org/2020/02/25/a-just-transition-for-coal-communities/.

91

New Mexico Energy Transition Act, SB 489 (2019),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber=S&LegType=B&LegNo=489&ye
ar=19.
92

93 Kieran Harrahill & Owen Douglas, Framework Development for “Just Transition” in Coal
Producing Jurisdictions, 134 Energy Policy 1, 8 (2019).
94

Id.

Deborah A. Sunter, Sergio Castellanos, and Daniel M. Kammen, 2:1 Nature Sustainability
(2019).
95

96 U.S. Energy Information Administration, One in three U.S. households faced challenges in
paying energy bills in 2015 (2015),
https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/reports/2015/energybills/; Ariel Drehobl,
Lauren Ross, and Roxana Ayala, How High are Household Energy Burdens? An Assessment of
National and Metropolitan Energy Burden Across the United States, American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy (September 2020), available at
https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/u2006.pdf.
97 Ariel Drehobl, Lauren Ross, and Roxana Ayala, How High are Household Energy Burdens? An
Assessment of National and Metropolitan Energy Burden Across the United States, American
Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (September 2020), available at
https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/u2006.pdf.
98 Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy Justice in
Indigenous Communities, 56 Natural Resources Journal 369 (Summer, 2016).

Climate, Energy, Justice

95

See, e.g., Christopher W. Tessum et al., Inequity in Consumption of Goods and Services Adds
to Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Air Pollution Exposure, 116 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES 6001 (2019) (documenting existing disparities in exposure to particulate matter
as well as racial disparities between responsibility for causing emissions and likelihood of
experiencing them).
99

100 Rosa M. Cuéllar-Franca & Adisa Azapagic, Carbon Capture, Storage and Utilisation
Technologies: A Critical Analysis and Comparison of their Life Cycle Environmental Impacts,
9 JOURNAL OF CO2 UTILIZATION 82, 87-92 (2015).

California has been regulating diesel pollution to accomplish both public health and
climate objectives. Most recently, the state adopted regulations requiring that
manufacturers increase sales of zero-emission trucks, beginning in 2024. California Air
Resources Board, Advanced Clean Trucks Fact Sheet: Accelerating Zero-Emission Truck Markets
(June 25, 2020), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/advanced-clean-trucks-factsheet.
101

CalEPA, Health Effects of Diesel Exhaust,
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/calenviroscreen/indicators/diesel4-02.pdf

102

See Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, 42 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
REPORTER 11125 (2012).
103

Matthew E. Hauer, Jason M. Evans and Deepak R. Mishra, Millions Projected To Be at Risk
from Sea-Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE: LETTERS 691, 691
(2016).

104

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FROM LAB TO MARKET: EXAMPLES OF CLEAN ENERGY R&D available at
https://www.energy.gov/R%26D.

105

Energy Information Administration, U.S. Electricity Generation from Renewables
Surpassed Coal in April (January 2, 2020).

106

Jonathan Shieber, With $84 Million in New Cash, Commonwealth Fusion is on Track for a
Demonstration of Fusion Reactor by 2025, TECHCRUNCH (May 26, 2020).

107

108Ivan

Penn, The Next Energy Battle, Renewables vs. Natural Gas, N.Y TIMES (July 6, 2020).

109

Frank Holmes, Time to Overweight Renewable Energy, BETA (June 11, 2020).

110

See Zero Zone, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2016)

111

California v. Bernhardt, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2020 WL 4001480 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

NAS, Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon
Dioxide (2017).

112

GAO, Identifying a Federal Entity to Address the National Academies’ Recommendations
Could Strengthen Regulatory Analysis (June 2020) (GAO 20-254).

113

114 Interagency Working Group, Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the
Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (August
2016).

See Hal Bernton, Clash Over Cap-and-Trade in Oregon Reflects Hard Path of Carbon Pricing
in Pacific Northwest, THE SEATTLE TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/clash-over-cap-and-trade-in-oregon-reflects-hard-path-of-carbon-pricing-in-pacificnorthwest/.
115

See United States Climate Alliance, Inventory of Climate and Energy Policies, Policies by
State, http://www.usclimatealliance.org/state-climate-energy-policies (last visited July 10,
2020)
116

The analysis in this Summary is derived from Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L.
Glicksman, Reorganizing Government: A Functional and Dimensional Framework (NYU
Press 2019).

117

Climate, Energy, Justice

96

118

New York v. United States, 5050 U.S. 144 (1992).

The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program,
84 Fed. Reg. 41310 (2019).

119

The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24174 (Apr. 30, 2020).

120

Ann E. Carlson, Meredith J. Hanks, & Julia E. Stein, Shifting Gears: The Federal Government’s
Reversal on California’s Clean Air Act Waiver (2019), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/CA-Car-Standards-IB-2019.pdf.
121

California Reaches Climate Deal with Automakers, Spurning Trump, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2019,
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-07-25/california-reaches-climate-deal-withautomakers-spurning-trump.
122

U.S. Climate Change Litigation, Common Law Claims, http://climatecasechart.com/casecategory/common-law-claims/ .
123

AG Ellison sues ExxonMobil, Koch Industries & American Petroleum Institute for
deceiving, defrauding Minnesotans about climate change,
https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/06/24_ExxonKochAPI.asp.

124

U.S. CHAMBER, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, MITIGATING MUNICIPALITY LITIGATION (2019),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Mitigating-MunicipalityLitigation-2019-Research.pdf.
125

Manufacturers’ Accountability Project, About Us,
https://mfgaccountabilityproject.org/about-us/.

126

Letter to Speaker Pelosi and Minority Leader McCarthy from Rep. Jamie Raskin, May 4,
2020, https://www.eenews.net/assets/2020/05/06/document_cw_01.pdf.

127

The State Energy & Envtl. Impact Ctr., NYU School of Law, Climate & Health Showdown in
the Courts: State Attorneys General Prepare to Fight (2019),
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/climate-and-health-showdown-in-thecourts.pdf.
128

John Schwartz, Major Climate Change Rules the Trump Administration Is Reversing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/climate/climate-rule-trumpreversing.html.
129

Climate, Energy, Justice

97

